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ARTICLE
ESOPs AND ECONOMIC DISTORTION
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JONATHAN R. MACEY**
Since 1974, Congress has created numerous tax benefits favoring Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Congress significantly expanded
those benefits with the Deficit Reduction Act of1984, and as a result the
use ofESOPs is likely to increase substantially in the future.
In this Article, Professors Doernberg and Macey argue that ESOPs do
not deliver the non-tax benefits claimedfor them by proponents and cause
inefficient market distortions. After exploring the history and requirements
ofESOPs, they discuss various market distortions caused by ESOPs, with
pa;ticular emphasis on the market for corporate control. After reviewing
the treatment ESOPs have received in recent tax reform proposals, Pro-
fessors Doernberg and Macey conclude by suggesting that many of the
beneficial goals ESOPs are alleged to serve could be better achieved by
modifYing the laws governing individual retirement accounts.
We embark upon a critical journey through an area of tax-
created incentives that have been widely praised, but narrowly
understood. An Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") is
a deferred compensation plan where the employer's stock is
held in trust for the benefit of employees. An employer can
deduct the value of stock contributions to the trust while em-
ployees are permitted to postpone the recognition of income
until they withdraw stock or other property from the trust. I
Senator Russell Long (D-La.), a leading advocate of ESOP
legislation in Congress, sings the praises of ESOPs as follows:
Tomorrow's economic system will be born out of the deci-
sions that we in this Chamber make today .... We simply
must enact incentives to insure that tomorrow's free enter-
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prise system is financed so as to be more broadly owned
... By enacting such incentives, we can bring about a
new sense of connection and participation. That, in turn,
will help us to more fully enlist the drive, enthusiasm, and
intelligence of the American public.2
There has been some criticism of the use of ESOPs. These
critics have primarily argued that there are other tax-motivated
transactions that offer corporations and plan participants the
same strategic benefits as ESOPs at lower cost.3 This Article
suggests that the problems with ESOPs are more fundamental.
The tax advantages of ESOPs do not provide the non-tax ben-
efits to workers that proponents suggest, and they cause ineffi-
ciency and distortion in the market.
It is not the tax advantages of ESOPs that cause problems.
Rather, the severe limitations and restrictions on corporate be-
havior imposed by ESOP legislation are the cause of the unde-
sirable inefficiency and distortion. Actually, the favorable tax
treatment of ESOPs is largely consistent with the principles
underlying a consumption tax.4 As discussed below, a con-
2129 CONGo REC. S16,638 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
3 See, e.g., Baldwin, The Myths ofEmployee Ownership, FORBES, Apr. 23, 1984, at
108-10 (citing problems at worker-owned companies and suggesting successes may be
due to factors other than ESOPs); Hoerr, ESOPs: Revolution or Ripoff?, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 15, 1985, at 94, 102-10 (potential for abuse as shown by recent ESOP leveraged
buyouts raise serious questions of ESOP utility to workers and to society at large);
Huene, Beware the ESOP: A Cautionary Tale, 1976 TAX ADVISOR 722 (leveraged ESOPs
are more expensive to present shareholders than conventional financing and rarely
provide unique benefits); Kaplan, ESOP's Fable: A Tale of Tax Planning Pitfalls and
Opportunities Associated with Employee Stock Ownership Plans Complete with a
Choice ofMorals, 53 TAXES 898 (1975) (claimed benefits of ESOPs as a financing tool
may be largely illusory; corporation better served by existing methods); Levin, Are
Leveraged Employee Buyouts Fatally Flawed?, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1985, at 30, col. 3
(use of ESOP for leveraged employee buyout damaging to firm because it results in
over-indebtedness without any real gain); Ronan, supra note 1, at 117-18 (insufficent
safeguards for plan participants); Sherman & Lewis, The ESOP Fallacy, 3 J. PENSION
PLAN & COMPLIANCE 226 (1977) (touted benefits of ESOPs offset by drawbacks and
available through conventional types of plans such as stock bonus and profit-sharing).
4 As its name implies, a consumption tax subjects a taxpayer to a tax on income used
for consumption purposes rather than on all income. In many consumption tax config-
urations, consumption is measured by totalling a taxpayer's income and then subtracting
amounts saved or invested. The difference between income and savings (investments)
is consumption. There is a rich literature on consumption taxes. See, e.g., Doernberg,
A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70 IOWA L. REV. 425 (1985) (discussing the
proposal advanced by Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, senior fellows at the Hoover
Institute); R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX (1983); DEP'T
OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977); Bradford, The Case for a
Personal Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED INCOME OR EXPENDITURE 75
(1. Pechman ed. 1980); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
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sumption tax reverses the anti-saving, anti-investment bias of
our income tax.5 Thus, in one sense, ESOPs may represent a
step in the right direction. While the movement to a consump-
tion tax offers much promise, the ESOP experience illustrates
that piecemeal changes toward such a tax only guarantee com-
plexity and inefficiency.
The use of ESOPs Is not widespread,6 but the sharply en-
hanced tax benefits for ESOPs enacted as part of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 19847 assure their rapid growth. While details
of the 1984 changes are discussed below,8 perhaps the most
significant change is tax-subsidized borrowing made available
to corporations with ESOPs, which will enable them to borrow
at lower interest rates than other borrowers.9 The availability
of this preference will inevitably cause ESOP formation by firms
that otherwise would not have considered the plans.
Mter a brief exploration of the history and requirements of
ESOPs in Part I, this Article attempts to shed some light on the
claims made by ESOP supporters in Part II. ESOPs are claimed
to hold the key to curing much of what ails this country socially
and economically.lo These claims simply are not supportable.
Moreover, regulation of employee compensation through tax
incentives alters behavior in an inefficient manner. Part III fo-
cuses on an important illustration of such inefficiency-the mar-
ket for corporate control. Part IV addresses the effects that
comprehensive tax reform might have on ESOPs.
I. How ESOPS WORK
While the notion of employee stock ownership traces back to
the nineteenth century, II the modern era of ESOPs started in
the 1950's when Louis Kelso first presented his thesis of own-
5 See infra text accompanying note 85-90.
6 Accurate data on ESOPs is virtually impossible to obtain. One source has estimated
7000 ESOPs with nearly 10 million participants. Hoerr, Bus. WK., supra note 3, at 94.
7 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified at
26 U.S.C. § 1).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 55-59.
9 See I.R.C. § 133(a) (West Supp. 1985); Sheppard, ESOPs, Wealth Distribution, and
Leveraged Buyouts, 1984 TAX NOTES 1270, 1271 (suggesting that ESOPs will be able to
borrow at rates one-third lower than the prime lending rate).
10 See infra text accompanying note 83.
II The first formal plan on record in the United States was started by Rand, McNally
and Co. in 1879. D. PECKMAN, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: A DECISION
MAKER'S GUIDE (Apr. 1983)(unpublished manuscript).
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ership based on labor and capital. 12 Kelso reasoned that tech-
nology is the principal factor in increasing productivity, and that
technology operates solely on capitalY Accordingly, Kelso
viewed capital, not labor, as the primary source of wealth in an
industrial society.14 He saw no way of sharing the affluence of
the United States unless capital ownership was made available
to labor. 15 Neither he nor other ESOP advocates cogently ex-
plain why government regulation through tax incentives will lead
to his goal of wealth redistribution throughout society.
According to Kelso, capitalist economies must artificially en-
large labor's share of income in order to avoid mass starvation
and the concomitant social disorder. This wealth transfer sup-
posedly is accomplished through unionization and the pursuit
of inflationary full-employment policies that keep the demand
for and the price of labor high. The excess income allocated to
labor allegedly leads to a reduction in capital which leads in turn
to inadequate development of new technology, stagnant produc-
tivity, and high rates of inflation. This wealth transfer also leads
to a distortion in the allocation of income between labor and
capital. 16
Kelso's solution to the perceived problem was to restructure
the economic system so that capital resources would be more
widely dispersed. 17 This would allow capital to receive the rate
of return Kelso believed it deserved without relegating laborers
to poverty.
ESOPs were the mechanism for implementing Kelso's plan.
He envisioned employee investment plans borrowing money
(using the credit of the sponsoring employer) to finance corpo-
rate investment through the purchase of employer stock. The
employer would then repay the original loan to the ESOP. As
the loan was repaid, employees would become owners of large
12 L. KELSO & M. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958).
13 [d. at 39.
14 [d. at 171-72.
IS Kelso more recently contended that workers do not invest in capital because very
few of them earn enough in wages to allow them the luxury of purchasing stock.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Heari[lgs Before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1975) (statement of Louis O. Kelso, Managing Direc-
tor, Kelso Bangert & Co.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
16 Kelso estimated that labor's actual contribution to production is in the range of
10%, with capital contributing 90%. L. KELSO & M. ADLER, supra note 12, at 41.
Economists dispute his figures, arriving at a 75% contribution by labor to capital's 25%.
T. JOCHIM, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP AND RELATED PLANS 12 (1982) (quoting
Paul Samuelson, Nobel laureate in economics).
17 See L. KELSO & M. ADLER, supra note 12, at 28-29.
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blocks of capital in the form of stock allocated to their individual
accounts.
The first such "leveraged" employee stock ownership plan
was adopted in 1957. 18 For reasons discussed extensively
throughout this Article, the plans proved to be unpopular and
few firms adopted them. All else equal, employees prefer com-
pensation in the form of cash rather than stock in their employ-
er's firm. Thus, from 1956 until 1974 Kelso's concept languished
in obscurity.19
Beginning in 1974, however, with the passage ofthe Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), which es-
tablished ESOPs as separately defined forms of stock bonus
plans, replete with special fiduciary and distribution require-
ments, ESOPs have steadily gained in popularity.2o Congress
has given employers massive regulatory incentives to create
ESOPs, thus correcting the market's failure to do so on its
own.21 Before 1984, these incentives met with limited success;
18 The first leveraged ESOP was started by Peninsula Newspapers, Inc. STAFF OF
JOINT ECON. COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF NEW
CAPITAL: ESOPS AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 58 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited
as JOINT ECON. COMM. STAFF].
Kelso is so much identified with the leveraged ESOP idea that this type of ESOP is
often denominated as a "Kelso Plan." See, e.g., Henle & Gravell, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans: Current Status and Proposed Legislation, Congo Research Service
Multilith No. 75-l59E, at CRS-7 (July 9, 1975), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 15, at
9, 17.
19 Estimates vary, but most authorities put the number of ESOPs in 1975 in the 200-
300 range. See Hearings, supra note 15, at 93 (app. to statement of Charles Walker,
Ass't Sec'y Tax PoI'y, U.S. Treas. Dep't). Of the 229 firms responding to a nonscientific
survey conducted by the ESOP Association in 1983, only 37 (16%) had established their
ESOPs before 1975. THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, ESOP SURVEY 1983, at 15. The relative
paucity of ESOPs prompted a congressional staff studying them to state that they had
not been "widely adopted." JOINT ECON. COMM. STAFF, supra note 18, at 59.
2Q See infra note 21. ESOPs, unlike other qualified plans, can transact with the
employer or another party in interest or otherwise disqualified person, I.R.C.
§ 4975(d)(3) (1982), and benefits arising under an ESOP must, in most instances, be
distributable in employer securities. Id. § 4975(e)(7) (requiring compliance with I.R.C.
§ 409(h) (West Supp. 1985».
21 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as ERISA]. The preferential treatment of ESOPs began with the
ERISA provisions which aIlowed borrowing by an ESOP from the employer (an oth-
erwise disqualified person) or under the employer's guarantee, I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3)
(1982), and for deduction of contributions made to an ESOP for repayment of both
principal and interest. I.R.C. § 404(a) (West Supp. 1985). As part of their design to
"invest primarily in qualifying employer securities," I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1982), ESOPs
are excused from the diversification requirement imposed by ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(1) (1982) upon most qualified retirement plans to the extent of the
ESOP's investment in employer securities. ERISA, § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2)
(1982).
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26, 36-40, created a new
form of qualified plan, caIled a Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plan (TRASOP),
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although there were over 5000 ESOPs in existence by 1983 they
still were not much of a factor in the compensation of workers.22
But the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ushered in a new era for
ESOPs.
A. The Structure of an ESOP
An ESOP gives employers who pay some portion of an em-
ployee's compensation in the form of stock significant tax ad-
vantages.23 The stock is held by a trust, unavailable to employ-
in which allowable contributions were tied to an employer's capital investment rather
than to payroll. A participating employer received a one percent tax credit for transfer-
ring stock equal to one percent of qualified capital investment to an ESOP. See I.R.C.
§ 48(n) (1982), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,98 Stat.
494 (for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983). Contribution to TRASOPs were
increased by the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1583-91.
To make ESOPs and TRASOPs more attractive to closely-held corporations, the
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2787-96, allowed for distri-
butions in cash rather than stock and implemented a put-option requirement for stock
not readily marketable. [d. at 2789.
Congress destroyed TRASOPs with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172,289-96, by eliminating the tie-in of the contribution allowance
to the investment tax credit, but continued the tax credit idea by allowing a credit,
equal to up to one-half percent of payroll, for contributions to a "PAYSOP."
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, made ESOPs
substantially more attractive, with its provisions for a rollover of gains from sale of
stock to an ESOP, I.R.C. § 1042 (West Supp. 1985); for deduction of cash dividend
payments, id. § 404(k); for exclusion by the lender of 50% of the interest earned on
ESOP loans, id. § 133(a); and for assumption by an ESOP of estate tax liability in an
amount equal to the value of stock held by the estate transferred to the ESOP. [d.
§ 2210.
Additionally, the federal government's bailout ofChrysler Corporation depended upon
that company's creation of an ESOP. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979
§ 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-75, at § 1866 (1982).
22 129 CONGo REC. S5836 (daily ed. May 3, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long). For a
1985 estimate, see supra note 6.
23 I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1982) defines an ESOP as "a defined contribution plan: which
is a qualified stock bonus plan, or a stock bonus and money purchase plan both of
which are qualified under § 401(a), and which are designed to invest primarily in qual-
ifying employer securities ...." I.R.C. § 414(i) (1982).
In a "defined contribution plan" where allowable contriblltions to the plan are either
fixed or limited, the benefits received by employees depend on the contribution levels.
[d.
Treasury regulations describe a stock bonus plan essentially as a profit-sharing plan
in which employer contributions are not necessarily tied to profits and distributions to
plan participants are in the form of employer securities. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii)
(1960). The stock bonus plan may provide a strict formula for yearly employer contri-
butions or may leave the amount of yearly contributions to the employer's discretion.
[d. § 1.401-1(a)(2)(iii).
A money purchase plan sets a definite formula or a specific amount for the yearly
employer contribution. See [d. § 1.401-1(b)(I)(i); Rey. Rul. 57-312, 1957-2 C.B. 255.
T~e regimen for qualification under I.R.C. § 401 is multifaceted. For an in-depth
consideration of the provisions see Ronan, supra note 1, at 119-33.
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ees until retirement. The employer receives a tax deduction of
the stock's fair market value at the time it is contributed to the
trust,24 and employees are not taxed on the stock until they
withdraw it.25 The plan must invest primarily in qualifying em-
ployer securities-generally common stock.26 Although an
ESOP must be "designed to invest primarily" in employer se-
curities, the phrase is not defined,27 nor are there any judicial
or administrative rulings on the meaning of "primarily" or the
percentage of trust assets that must be qualifying employer
securities.28 Instead of contributing stock itself, employers can
make cash contributions to ESOPs that can be used by the
ESOP to purchase stock from shareholders or from the
employer.29
Contributions to ESOPs must not discriminate in favor of
officers, shareholders, or other highly compensated employ-
24 I.R.C. § 402(a) (1982).
2S [d. § 402(a). Many of the technicalities governing the treatment of ESOPs will be
simplified or ignored for the purposes of this discussion where, in the author's opinion,
they add nothing to the arguments.
26 A qualifying employer security is·common stock of the employer that either is
readily tradable on an established market or has a combination of voting power and
dividend rights equal to or in excess of the most favorable dividend rights and voting
power of any other class of common stock. I.R.C. § 409(1) (West Supp. 1985). Non-
callable preferred stock can be a qualifying employer security if it is convertible into
qualified common stock at a reasonable price at any time. [d. Bonds, debentures, or
other debt instruments do not constitute qualifying employer securities even if market-
able. [d. Stock issued by corporations controlled by the employer can also satisfy the
qualifying employer securities requirement. I.R.C. §§ 4975(e)(8) (1982), 409(1) (West
Supp. 1985). See Ronan, supra note 1, at 125-26.
27 A plan may invest in assets other than qualifying employer securities as long as it
satisfies the "primarily" test. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-1l(b) (1977).
28 One writer has suggested a 51% qualifying threshold. Elinsky, supra note 1, at
§ 7.03[2]. A survey conducted in 1983 by the ESOP Association found that approxi-
mately 80% of the respondent plans had at least 75% of their assets invested in employer
stock, with the overall average investment level for the 229 plans responding being
87.7%. THE ESOP ASSOCIATION, supra note 19, at 28-29.
29 A leveraged ESOP can be a highly desirable mechanism for buying out a principal
shareholder, for both the company and the selling stockholder. If three conditions are
met, the shareholder can avoid having to meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 302 (1982)
in order to secure capital gains treatment on the sale. The three conditions, imposed by
implication of Rev. Proc. 77-30, 1977-2 C.B. 539, are: (1) the selling shareholder and
related persons cannot "own" more than 20% of the beneficial interest in the ESOP;
(2) restrictions on distribution of the stock sold to the ESOP by the shareholder cannot
be harsher than restrictions on a majority of stock held by other shareholders; and
(3) the employer and the ESOP must expressly state that redemption of the stock from
the ESOP is not contemplated. Moreover, the shareholder can defer taxation on the
gain realized from the sale by reinvesting the proceeds in certain qualifying securities
within a specified period of time. I.R.C. § 1042 (West Supp. 1985). For further analysis
of the requirements for a leveraged ESOP buyout of a principal stockholder, see Ronan,
supra note 1, at 145-49.
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ees.30 In addition, the ESOP must satisfy a medley of minimum
participation and vesting standards, imposed to shore up the
nondiscriminatory aims of preferential pension legislation. 31 An
ESOP must cover either seventy percent or more of all em-
ployees, or eighty percent of all eligible employees as long as
seventy percent or more of the employees are eligible, or satisfy
the Secretary of Labor that the classification used is not dis-
criminatory.32 The benefits that accrue to a participant's account
from the corporation's contributions must vest according to a
choice of vesting schedules ranging from no vesting during the
first ten years of service, but 100% vesting upon completion of
year ten, to gradual vesting from the end of five years of service
3°I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1982). Benefits and contributions may be proportional to com-
pensation without being deemed discriminatory. Id. § 401(a)(5).
If a plan is found to be "top-heavy," i.e., if "key employees" (officers, those earning
more than the current $30,000 limit in § 415(c)(I)(A), and "owners"), I.R.C. § 1I6
(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985), have account balances which, combined, exceed 60% of
the sum of the account balances of all employees under the plan, I.R.C. § 416(g)(1)
(1982), the plan is subject to the more stringent contribution and vesting rules of I.R.C.
§§ 416(b), (c), and (h) (1982). An employee is an "owner" for purposes of the "key
employee" definition if he is one of the 10 largest shareholders of the employer, owns
more than one-half of one percent of the outstanding employer securities and earns
more than the limit set by I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) (1982); or if he owns five percent of the
outstanding securities issued by the employer; or earns over $150,000 per year from the
employer and owns at least a one percent interest in the employer. Treas. Reg. § 1.416-
1 (1984).
31 See generally I.R.C. §§ 401 (1982) (discrimination in favor of "prohibited group" of
officers, shareholders or highly paid employees disallowed), 410 (establishing minimum
participation standards), 411 (setting forth three minimum vesting schemes and blanket
prohibition of "pattern of abuse") and 416 (setting forth procedure for determining if
plan is top-heavy and penalty for top-heavy plans). See Kaplan & Ludwig, supra note
I, at A-7 to A-9, for an excellent and concise explanation ofthe participation and vesting
requirements.
32I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) (1982). The latter test allows more flexibility. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5)
(1982) permits an ESOP scheme to limit eligibility to salaried or clerical workers, subject
to the general prohibition of discrimination in favor of the "prohibited group" ofofficers,
owners and highly-paid employees contained in I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1982). See supra
note 30. Some courts have developed a "fair cross-section" test which examines the
cross-section of employees covered by the plan according to compensation level. See
John Duguid & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 101, 105 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
See also Fujinom Optical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 499, 508 (1981); Pulver Roofing
Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001, 1013-14 (1978).
Universal participation is not mandated. The plan may include a minimum age for
participation not exceeding 21 years, I.R.C. § 410(a)(1)(A)(i) (1982), a minimum length
of employment, id. § 41O(a)(1)(A)(ii), and minimum continuous service requirements,
id. § 41O(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1985), but may not place a limit on a participant's
maxmium age, id. § 41O(a)(2) (1982). Employees may be temporarily excluded from
participation in employer contributions and reallocation of forfeitures for years in which
they complete less than 1000 hours of service, id. § 411(b)(3)(C), or for periods in which
they fail to make mandatory contributions to the plan, id. § 411(a)(4)(B). Employees
temporarily excluded must nonetheless continue to share in profits and losses of the
plan. Id. § 411(b)(3).
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through fifteen years of service.33 Whatever vesting schedule is
chosen, I.R.C. § 411(d)(l)34 prohibits any pattern of abuse, such
as dismissal, which may tend to discriminate in favor of em-
ployees who are officers, shareholders, or highly compensa~ed.
All ESOP assets must be held in trust and be managed by a
trustee.35 With some exceptions,36 the trustee is named by the
sponsor corporation's board of directors or a 'committee ap-
pointed by the board and is subject to the direction and authority
of the appointing groupY The trustee is subject to the general
fiduciary rules of ERISA requiring him or her to act with pru-
dence exclusively for the purpose of providing benefits to par-
ticipants.38 However, other basic fiduciary requirements appli-
cable to pension plans are relaxed to account for the special
purpose of ESOPs. ESOPs are exempt from the diversification
requirements normally imposed on pension plan trustees since
ESOPs are designed to invest in employer's stock.39 ESOPs can
also purchase stock from an employer or from other parties in
interest (major shareholders, officers, and directors) even
though I.R.C. § 4975 prohibits such transactions for most pen-
sion plans.40 In addition, I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3) and ERISA
§ 408(b)(3) permit an ESOP to borrow money from a party in
interest, such as the employer, for the acquisition of employer
stock.41
331d. § 411(a). The vesting schedules concern only those allocations or contributions
to an employee's account that are attributable to the employer. An employee must
always be 100% vested in his own contributions. ld. § 411(a)(1).
).I ld. § 411(d)(1).
3S ERISA, supra note 21, at §§ 402(a)(I) and 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1l02(a)(l) and
1l03(a).
36 See id. § 403(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1l03(a)(2).
371d. at § 403(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1l03(a)(l).
381d. at § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(I).
391d. at § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(2). To the extent that an ESOP invests in
assets other than the employer's stock, ERISA's diversification requirements apply. ld.
at § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(1).
4(\ ld. at § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1l08(e). The exemption applies only if the price paid
for the stock constitutes "adequate consideration." ld.
411d. at § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1l08(e); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3) (1982). This exception to
normal fiduciary restrictions covers direct loans, loan guarantees and installment sales,
and assumes compliance with restrictions, including a reasonable interest rate, collateral
restricted to' employer securities, and primary benefit to employees. The Departments
of Labor and Treasury have placed restrictions on ESOP "interested party" loans. 29
C.F.R. § 2550A08b-3(c) (1984); Treas. Reg. § 54A975-7(b)(3) (1977). These posit an
"arms-length transaction" standard to test the fairness of the loan terms and prohibit
transactions which would siphon off the plan assets. In addition to limiting collateral to
the employer securities being purchased with loan proceeds, 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-3(e)
(1984) and Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(5) (1977) mandate a "no recourse" clause in the
loan provisions and restrict the plan's liability for repayment to employer contributions
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ESOP participants must be entitled to vote the stock held in
their accounts.42 If the issuing corporation has no outstanding
stock that must be registered, no voting rights pass-through is
required except where, according to the corporate charter or
applicable law, a matter must be decided by more than a ma-
jority vote of the outstanding common shares voted.43
If a participant in an ESOP is entitled to a distribution, he
must have the right to demand that his benefits be distributed
in the form of employer securities.44 If no demand is made, the
employer can make cash distributions.45 Unless the securities
received can be readily traded on an established market, a par-
ticipant must have the right to require the employer (not the
ESOP) to repurchase t.he securities for their fair market value.46
The annual contribution and other additions for an ESOP
participant cannot exceed the lesser of thirty thousand dollars
or twenty-five percent of-annual compensation.47 Similarly sit-
other than stock, earnings on such contributions, and cash dividends on employer stock.
Under 29 C.F.R. § 25500408b-3(e) (1984) and Treas. Reg. § 54-4975-7(b)(8) (1977), the
encumbered shares of employer stock must be released to participants' accounts as the
loan is repaid. Demand loans are not permitted and a definite term must be set. 29
C.F.R. § 25500408b-3(f) (1984); Treas. Reg. § 5404975-7(b)(7) (1977).
Ifan ESOP interested party loan fails to satisfy any of the conditions described above,
the loan may be declared a prohibited transaction under l.R.C. § 4975 and the trans-
gressing interested party may incur a five percent excise tax penalty, which can be
increased to 100% if the transaction is not sanitized. I.R.C. §§ 4975(a) and (c) (1982).
42Id. § 4975(e)(7).
43Id. §§ 409(e)(3) (West Supp. 1985) and 401(a)(22) (1982). The minimal voting rights
requirement seems inadequate in view of the stated purpose of ESOPsj to give the
employee some ownership interest in his employer. See generally ERISA, supra note
21, at § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102. As pointed out by Ronan, supra note 1, at 128-30, stock
is allocated to the accounts of participants in a leveraged ESOP only as the loan taken
out to purchase the stock is paid off. See Treas. Reg. §§ 5404975-11(c),(d); 5404975-
7(b)(8)(15) (1977). Employees have no voting control at all until stock is allocated to
their individual accounts. See I.R.C. §§ 4975(e) (1982), 409(e) (West Supp. 1985). Even
after allocation, employees of companies with no securities required to be registered
may vote only on a few relatively rare corporate transactions. This provision is partic-
ularly disturbing because many companies with ESOPs are small, closely-held corpo-
rations which are unlikely to have registered securities. See infra text accompanying
notes 102-03. Thus, participants are often effectively excluded from the control normally
incident to corporate ownership.
44 I.R.C. § 409(h)(1)(A) (\Vest Supp. 1985).
45 Id.§ 409(b)(2).
46 Id. § 409(h)(l)(B).
47 Id. § 415(c)(I) (1982). For purposes of the annual addition limitation, an employee's
"compensation" includes, in addition to his or her salary and other usual components,
employer contributions to defined contribution plans, forfeitures allocated to the em-
ployee's account and the lesser of one-half of employee contributions or all employee
contributions over six percent of compensation. See id. § 415(c)(2).
Starting in 1986, the $30,000 limitation will be adjusted for cost-of-Iiving increases. If
an ESOP allocates one third or less of employer contributions to officers, ten-percent
shareholders, or highly compensated employees, the annual addition limitation can be
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uated employees must be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner
under the plan.48 In determining the amounts allocated to the
accounts of participants, forfeitures from unvested accounts do
not increase the allocable amounts, but instead reduce the em-
ployer's allowable tax-deductible contribution.49
B. The Tax Treatment of an ESOP
Traditionally, there have been three primary tax benefits to
ESOPs. First, employers can deduct contributions to an ESOP
in an amount up to twenty-five percent of the compensation of
all participants.5o No ceiling exists where the employer's con-
tributions are used by the plan to pay interest on a loan incurred
to buy employer securities.51 Second, income earned by the trust
is exempt from taxation until distributed.52 Third, employees are
taxed on distributions when made, but can use certain averaging
and rollover provisions not ordinarily available to non-pension
plan compensation.53 While all qualified pension plans enjoy tax
incentives as compared with direct compensation, the liberal
deduction limitations for employer contributions to an ESOP
along with the borrowing opportunities available through an
ESOP offer significant advantages which other types of pension
plans cannot match.
Four new provisions enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 198454 give ESOPs even greater tax advantages over other
forms of compensation. First, any shareholder who sells quali-
doubled to the extent that the additional allocation is used for employer securities either
contributed to or purchased by the plan. [d. § 415(e)(6).
48 See supra notes 30-32.
49 I.R.C. § 415(c)(2) (1982). See supra note 47.
50 I.R.C. § 404 (West Supp. 1985). For an ESOP consisting only of a stock bonus
plan, the employer may deduct contributions up to 15% of total compensation of
participants and carry over into future years any unused portion of the ceiling. See id.
§ 404(a)(3)(A). Where an employer maintains a stock bonus plan in conjunction with
some other type of pension plan, there is a ceiling on total deductible contributions
equal to 25% of total compensation. [d. § 404(a)(7).
SI [d. § 404(a)(9)(B). Employer contributions to an ESOP to permit the ESOP's re-
payment of loan principal are deductible up to 25% of the compensation of participating
employees without regard to employer contributions to other plans. See id.
§ 404(a)(9)(A). Note that the limits on deductibility may in some cases be more stringent
than the individual allocation limits. An employer is free to make nondeductible con-
tributions in excess of the deduction limitation so long as the individual allocatio(llimits
are not exceeded. [d.
52 [d. §§ 501(a), (c), (d) (1982).
53 [d. §§ 402(a), (e). See infra note 55.
54 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
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fled stock to an ESOP can elect to defer any taxable gain if:
(1) the proceeds are reinvested within a year in securities of a
domestic corporation; and (2) after the sale, the ESOP owns
thirty percent of the value of all employer stock.55 This provision
creates a strong tax incentive for shareholders to sell their stock
to an ESOP rather than to other purchasers because sales to
non-ESOP purchasers do not permit any deferral of gain, re-
gardless of timely reinvestment.
Second, the employer corporation is permitted a deduction
for cash dividends paid on stock held by an ESOP if the divi-
dends are distributed to ESOP participants.56 Distributing cor-
porations generally do not receive deductions for dividends
paid.
Third, LR.C. § 2210 allows an ESOP to assume a decedent's
estate tax liability in exchange for employer securities of equal
value.57 This provision allows large shareholders to cope with
liquidity problems in connection with estate tax obligations.
55 I.R.C. § 1042 (West Supp. 1985). Rollover treatment is afforded only to shareholders
of a corporation lacking any ready, established market for its securities. [d.
§ 1042(c)(l)(A). To qualify for this special nonrecognition provision, the taxpayer must
have held the securities for at least one year, and they cannot have been acquired either
through a qualified plan or stock option arrangement. [d. §§ 1042(c)(l)(B), 1042(c)(l)(C).
Nonrecognition treatment is unavailable if the ESOP allocates the purchased securities
for the benefit of the seIling shareholder, family members, or any other person who
owns more than 25% of the employer's stock. [d. § 1042(b)(3)(C).
The seIling shareholder is entitled to exclude from income any gain from the sale
which is reinvested in "qualified replacement property," defined as securities issued by
any domestic corporation with passive investment income (e.g., dividends, rents, roy-
alties) not exceeding 25% of gross receipts. [d. §§ 1042(a), 1042(c)(4). The qualified
replacement property must be purchased at any time from three months prior to and 12
months after the sale. Any gain in excess of the cost of the qualified replacement
property is recognized as income. See id. § 1042(c)(4). The "rollover" characteristic of
these transactions is attributable to the reduction of the shareholder's basis in the
replacement property by the amount of the gain not recognized by virtue of the ESOP·
favored treatment. See I.R.C. § 1042(d) (West Supp. 1985).
The Code authorizes the imposition of an excise tax on the employer-hence, the
requirement of employer consent to a shareholder's nonrecognition election-where the
stock acquired by the ESOP is disposed of within three years, and such disposal
decreases the total number of ESOP-owned shares or causes the ESOP to own less
than 30% of the employer's securities. See generally id. § 4978.
56 /d. § 404(k). The dividend must be paid in cash and be distributed to plan partici-
pants within 90 days of the close of the plan year. [d. § 404(k)(2). As stated in Ronan,
supra note 1, at 141-42, since participants' interest in stock bought with the proceeds
of an ESOP loan is minimal until the loan principal begins to be paid off, the dividend
deduction is of little value to a corporation in the early years of a leveraged ESOP
because the participants lack sufficient beneficial ownership in the stock to entitle them
to dividends.
57 I.R.C. § 2210 (West Supp. 1985) also provides generous deferral provisions for the
ESOP's payment of the estate taxes. If the ESOP and the estate qualify, the ESOP may
defer payment of the assumed tax liability for up to five years and nine months and
may take up to 10 years following the first installment to payoff the entire liability. /d.
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The fourth change will likely be the most significant in en-
couraging a dramatic increase in the use of ESOPs. An institu-
tionallender who extends a loan to an ESOP for the purpose of
enabling the plan to acquire employer securities can exclude
from income fifty percent of the interest received on the loans.58
The partial exemption will result in lower interest rates to ESOP-
borrowers and ultimately will lower the cost of financing proj-
ects to corporate sponsors who sell employer securities to the
ESOP.59
C. The Dynamics of ESOP Use
If no preferential tax treatment were given to ESOPs, other
pension plans, or other forms of compensation, employees gen-
erally would elect to receive all compensation in the form of
cash. This is because cash offers employees the greatest flexi-
bility for making expenditure choices among competing alter-
natives .. Corporations desiring capital for projects would have
to compete for funds from investors and lenders. There would
be no particular reason why employee-investors would be any
more disposed to purchase their employer's stock than outside
investors. Perhaps some investors would invest or lend money
to their employer; others would not.
The tax advantages accorded various forms of compensation
changes their relative desirability and their use by employees.
Compare compensation through an ESOP with direct cash pay-
ment. Suppose employee ("EE") and his employer ("ER") de-
termine that EE's services are worth $50,000 per year. Suppose
further that the compensation alternatives are either $50,000 in
cash or $40,000 in cash and a $10,000 contribution to an ESOP
to be allocated to EE's account.60 If EE receives all cash, ER
receives a $50,000 deduction and EE is taxed on the compen-
sation received.61 At this point, whatever expenditure choice
§ 6166(a) (1982). The installment payment method requires only four percent interest
payments, and employer contributions to pay the interest are deductible. [d.
§§ 2210(c)(2), 404(a)(9)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
sa [d. § 133(a).
• S9 See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
60 As indicated below, it is likely that the tax benefits associated with an ESOP will
be divided between the employer (i.e. shareholders) and employees depending on the
elasticities of the demand and supply curves for labor. See infra text accompanying
note 72.
61 I.R.C. § 162(a)(I) (1982).
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EE makes (for example, to purchase ER's stock), the expendi-
ture will be made with after-tax dollars.
If EE receives $40,000 in cash and a $10,000 contribution to
EE's account in an ESOP, the treatment of the cash compen-
sation does not change. From ER's perspective, the contribution
to the ESOP, like a $10,000 cash payment, will generate a
$10,000 deduction.62 Moreover, the existence of an ESOP will
permit ER to raise capital at less expense.63 For EE the contri-
bution to an ESOP means that $10,000 is unavailable for expen-
diture on alternative investments or consumption. Stated differ-
ently, EE is induced by the tax system to invest a portion of
his compensation in ER's stock. In exchange for the limitation
on EE's expenditure choice, EE is not taxed on the contribution
to the ESOP nor on any income earned by the ESOP until it is
distributed. The ability to invest pre-tax dollars in ER's stock
and to escape immediate taxation on the earnings of the stock
will influence EEs on the margin to prefer the ESOP contribu-
tion to a cash payment.
ESOPs represent only one of several deferred compensation
arrangements, all of which share certain basic tax benefits, in-
cluding immediate deduction for the employer and deferral of
taxation for the employee on both the initial contribution and
any income it generates.64 The total amount of compensation
that an employer can contribute to all types of pension plans
that an employer might maintain is limited by statute.6S In light
of these limitations, it is worthwhile to consider why an ESOP
may offer advantages over other pension plans.
The general fiduciary rules that govern the management of
pension trusts prohibit most sale and loan transactions between
a pension plan and a party in interest, including the employer,
major shareholders, directors, and officers,66 This restriction
62 Id. § 404(a) (West Supp. 1985).
63 Because the employer is only "bargaining" with the ESOP in a "leveraged" ESOP
transaction (see infra text accompanying notes 63-66), rather than with many buyers in
the open market, the transaction costs of raising capital through an ESOP are lower.
An ESOP transaction may also avoid the cost of underwriting and registering a new
stock issue. See Elinsky, supra note 1, at § 7.04[2][c).
64 I.R.C. § 404 (West Supp. 1985). This section along with §§ 402(a) and 403(a) are
part of the sweeping reforms brought about by the enactment of ERISA, supra note 21.
6S Contributions to profit-sharing and stock-bonus plans are aggregated for purposes
of the § 404 limitations. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
66 Id. § 4975 (1982). The "prohibited transaction" rules do not completely deny plans
the right to do business with interested persons. Defined benefit plans generally may
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makes most pension plans unsuitable as a means""of raising
capital. ESOPs, on the other hand, offer ready financing for
employers because these restrictions do not apply. In the ex-
ample above, ER can retain $10,000 in cash that would other-
wise be paid to EE by contributing stock worth $10,000 to an
ESOP. An ESOP also can borrow at subsidized rates to pur-
chase stock of the employer,67 providing another method of
financing projects. If an ESOP borrows money from a bank and
uses the proceeds to purchase stock from the employer, it is as
though the employer has borrowed money directly from the
bank. The loan is repaid through annual employer contributions
to the ESOP which in tum repays the lender. Use of an ESOP
to fund corporate projects in this manner is referred to as
leveraging.68
To illustrate how a leveraged ESOP might work, suppose that
X Corporation ("X Corp.") wishes to borrow one million dollars
for a building project that is expected to produce $554,820 a
year for five years. The project will require a present value of
one million dollars in labor costs payable over the five-year
period in annual installments of $277,410. Assume that the loan
is repayable over the same five-year period with annual pay-
ments equal to $277,410. At the market discount rate of twelve
percent built into the loan repayment schedule, X Corp. will be
indifferent about undertaking the project.69
invest up to 10% of assets in the employer corporation without need of providing any
voting rights pass-through to participants or of making distributions in employer stock.
ERISA, supra note 21, at § 407(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1l07(a), I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(22), (23) (1982).
Profit-sharing and stock-bonus plans may invest over 10% of plan assets in the employer
by including a clause allowing greater investment in the trust agreement itself. ERISA,
supra note 21, at § 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1l07(d)(3).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 9, 58-59.
6S See supra note 3.
69 If the project produces one penny more, X Corp. would undertake the project.
Besides the 12% market discount rate, this example assumes: (1) a 50% fiat tax rate
for all taxpayers; (2) a sinking fund depreciation schedule, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 133-35 (1985); and (3) the absence of inflation.







The loan principal would be amortized on the same schedule, thereby producing the
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Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, if X Corp. inves-
tigated financing the project through an ESOP, it would decide
to proceed. Typically, the ESOP would borrow $1,000,000 from
a bank. As part of the loan, the employer would guarantee the
loan and promise to contribute enough money to the ESOP to
permit the plan to make annual repayments. The ESOP would
use the proceeds to purchase one million dollars worth of stock
from X Corp. Every year X Corp. would contribute $277,410 to
the ESOP, enough to pay loan principal and interest. Compared
with direct financing, use of the ESOP leaves X Corp. with
$277,410 in cash (minus taxes) each year during the five-year
period because stock was used for compensation purposes
rather than cash.70
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 made financing through an
ESOP even more advantageous. Because the bank can exclude
interest payments received from the ESOP, the interest rate
charged will inevitably be lower.71 For example, if the bank
charges nine percent interest instead of twelve percent, X
following interest deductions computed by subtracting the loan principal amortization
from the annual $277,410 loan repayment:
Year I: $120,000
Year 2: $101,111
Year 3: $ 79,955
Year 4: $ 56,261
Year 5: $ 29,723
With this in mind, consider Year 1. X Corp. receives $554,820 but must pay $277,410
in labor costs and $277,410 to the bank. If there is any tax liability, X Corp. would not
undertake the project. However, the $554,820 in income is offset by the $277,410
deduction for compensation under I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982), the $120,000 interest de-
duction under I.R.C. § 163 and the $157,410 depreciation deduction under I.R.C. § 168.
Similarly, there will be no tax liability in Years 2-5 since the interest and depreciation
deductions will always total $277,410.
If X Corp. distributed its own stock rather than cash to its employees: (1) the tax
treatment of both the employer and employees would remain the same except that the
employees would have a tax liability on the fair market value of the $277,410 received
annually without having the cash to pay the taxes; and (2) X Corp. would retain $277,410
each year since compensation was paid in stock.
70 Using the tables set forth in supra note 69, in Year 1, X Corp. would have income
of $554,820 offset by a depreciation deduction of $157,410 and a deduction for the
contribution to the ESOP in the amount of $277,410. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(9) (West Supp.
1985). If it is in a 50% tax bracket X Corp. would pay $60,000 of taxes on the $120,000
of taxable income. The employees would not be taxed on the employer's contributions
to the employee stock ownership trust. See I.R.C. § 402(a)(l) (1982). Thus, comparing
this configuration with the nonqualified use of stock, supra note 69, in both cases X
Corp, has the use of $277,410 annually. Using nonqualified stock outside of the ESOP
context leads to a large tax on employees. Use of stock through an ESOP leads to a
smaller tax on the employer. Since the overall tax bite is smaller in the ESOP context,
X Corp. and its employees can be expected to divide the tax savings in a pareto optimal
manner. See infra note 72.
71 See Sheppard, supra note 9, see also text accompanying note 52.
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Corp.'s annual payments will be $257,093, a $20,317 savings
each year over the five-year period. The present value of the
savings at the commencement of the project is $73,239 before
taxes, or $36,620, assuming a fifty percent tax rate.
How these tax savings will be shared between employer and
employee is an empirical question depending on the elasticities
of the labor supply and demand curves facing a firm. If the firm
faces a firm-specific inelastic supply curve for labor, perhaps
because of specialized training or high relocation costs, the firm
rather than its employees will capture the lion's share of ESOP
tax benefits. If it is costly for employees to collect information
about and to move to other job opportunities even within the
same industry, a firm will not have to use its tax benefits to
retain employees and will be unable to use its tax benefits to
attract new employeesJ2
72 To take the extreme example, suppose that a firm faces a totally inelastic supply
curve for labor. The wage rate will be set at the minimum point on the inelastic curve.
Payment of a penny less will drive all workers to other pursuits. Payment of a penny
more is wasteful for the firm since no new workers will be attracted. If ESOP tax
benefits are introduced, X Corp. can attract the same number of workers by paying
less-the government makes up the difference. Consequently, X Corp. rather than the
employees would benefit from the ESOP tax benefits.
If a firm does not face a firm-specific inelastic labor supply curve, then the division
of the tax benefits will depend on the elasticity of the industry-wide labor supply curve.
If the supply of labor is very elastic so that a small rise in wage levels will result in a











Gains to employees ~
from ESOP tax benefits~
Gains to X corporation~
from ESOP tax benefits~
Supply of labor
Amount of labor
If tax benefits are introduced, X corp. can now get more labor for the same amount
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The use of a leveraged ESOP to fund projects less expensively
than through conventional financing leads to a variety of distor-
tions.73 The savings to a corporation or its employees from
borrowing through an ESOP are not wealth-created savings.
Rather- the savings simply represent a tax transfer from all tax-
payers to the corporation and those enrolled in ESOPs.
In addition to serving as a financing tool, an ESOP can provide
a market for the employer's securities in the close corporation
setting, thereby enabling shareholders to lessen the tax burden
of cashing in on the corporation's earnings. Suppose X Corp. is
managed by five key employees who own seventy-five percent
of its outstanding stock. If X Corp. performs well, and the
shareholders want to distribute the earnings to themselves, the
key employee-shareholders will be unable to obtain the earnings
without being taxed at ordinary income rates.74 If a distribution
is made or if there is a pro rata redemption, ordinary income
of money. Under such circumstances, X Corp. can attract new employees and still




Gains to employees ~






If the labor supply for the industry is very inelastic, however, such that changes in
wage level do not materially affect the supply of workers, X Corp. will have to give
most of the tax benefits to labor. This is because wages must be raised substantially
before new workers are attracted. If a firm does not increase wages, competitors will
bid away the firm's employees.
If a firm faces a firm-specific inelastic labor supply curve, however, as noted in the
text, then regardless of the elasticity of the labor supply for the industry. the firm will
capture most of the ESOP tax benefits.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
74 See I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) for the capital gains deduction.
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treatment will ensue.75 If the employee-shareholders sell their
stock to an independent third party, capital gains treatment may
apply.?6 There may be no market for stock of a closely held
corporation, however, and even if there is, the key managers
may be wary of giving up control. If they try to sell to a con-
trolled third party, like a newly formed controlled corporation,
again ordinary income treatment results.?7
But, if X Corp. sets up an ESOP, the plan can purchase stock,
giving the sellers the benefit of capital gains treatment without
having to sell to a fully independent third party and providing
X Corp. with a deduction for earnings contributed to the
ESOP.?8 Typically, the ESOP would borrow funds from a bank
at a tax subsidized interest rate. The funds would be used to
purchase the stock from the key managers. On an annual basis
X Corp. would make tax deductible contributions to the ESOP
which would be used to repay the loan with interest. While the
sale of stock to an ESOP would reduce the ownership interest
of the key managers, the reduction would be mitigated to the
extent that the managers were also ESOP participants. The
Internal Revenue Service will issue an advance ruling that a
proposed sale to an ESOP will qualify for capital gains treatment
if: (1) the beneficial interest of the selling shareholders in the
ESOP does not exceed twenty percent; (2) the stock is no more
restricted than other employer stock; and (3) the employer does
not intend to redeem stock from the plan.79
Participants not only may receive capital gains treatment on
a sales to an ESOP, but also may reinvest the proceeds in a
timely and appropriate fashion, so as to postpone recognition
of any gain on the sale.80 Therefore a seller may postpone rec-
ognition of gain on a sale to the ESOP while recognizing any
loss on a similar sale where the proceeds are not reinvested.81
II. THE SUPPOSED BENEFITS OF ESOPs
Ironically, the most vocal proponents of ESOPs have based
their support for the regulatory incentives encouraging ESOPs
7S See id. § 301.
76 See id. § 302(c)(2)(C).
77 See id. § 304.
78 The ESOP will be considered the alter ego of the employer for purposes of evalu-
ating the tax consequences of a redemption unless three conditions are met. See supra
note 29.
79 Rev. Proc. 77-30, 1977-2. C.B. 539-40.
80 The "rollover" provision is outlined at supra note 55.
81 I.R.C. § 1042 (West Supp. 1985).
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on a commitment to a private property, free enterprise philos-
ophy.82 The notion seems to be that employee stock ownership
is a good idea because it will transform workers into budding
capitalists, thereby improving productivity and broadening the
capital base.
The proponents of ESOP legislation extol its virtues in a
manner similar to those who peddle Ponzi schemes. Everyone
wins and no one loses. Employees supposedly benefit because
they are able to share in the financial success of the firm. Other
shareholders are supposed to benefit because the firm as a whole
is more valuable due to increased worker productivity. Society
is allegedly better off because current inequalities in the distri-
bution of wealth are ameliorated and the level of savings and
investment increases.83
If ESOPs are such an efficient method of employee compen-
sation, one wonders why firms need such strong tax incentives
to establish them. If ESOPs are truly "wealth creating" and
efficient in the sense that they make workers better off without
making anyone else worse off, there would be no need for
regulatory coaxing to induce firms to implement them. If these
plans provided benefits resembling those envisioned by their
proponents, marginal firms that did not develop ESOPs probably
could not survive in a competitive environment in which rival
firms offered such plans. Yet the market system did not develop
ESOl's voluntarily. These plans came into existence solely as a
result of regulatory prodding.84 This alone raises an initial ques-
tion about the efficiency claims made by ESOP proponents.
This Part examines more closely the claimed virtues of ESOPs
and suggests that the supposed benefits are illusory. Where
82 See, e.g., R. FRISCH, ESOP FOR THE '80s 10 (1982) ("ESOPs are already creating
millions of new capitalists without· taking anything from those who now own capital.
.As ESOPs proliferate, they may become the major hope for preserving our capitalistic
system and perhaps ultimately, our democratic way of life"); Johnson, Employee Stock
Owenership, RIPON Q., Summer 1975, at 34 ("[s]hall we revitalize the private enterprise
system with employee stock ownership and real social security that owners of private
capital can provide?"); 129 CONGo REC. SI~,629-30(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement
of Sen. Long)("[i]f we want this private property system of ours to succeed, we simply
must insure that as many Americans as possible have an opportunity to earn an own-
ership stake in that system").
83 See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 9, at 1270-71; see also R. FRISCH, supra note 82,
at 8-10 for an optimistic view of ESOPs as the first step in a comprehensive plan to
broaden the ownership of capital and thereby cure a litany of perceived economic woes,
including inflation, low productivity, employee disgruntlement, foreign competition, high
interest rates, disregard of the arts, and unionization.
84 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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ESOPs do provide workers with true benefits, they are pur-
chased by all taxpayers through foregone revenue, and thus do
not provide the kind of income redistribution that. is generally
claimed. Moreover, the tax incentives cause distortions in the
economy that may lead to inefficient behavior.
A. ESOPs Lead to Increased Savings and Investment
Some supporters praise ESOPs because they lead to increased
savings and investment.85 While it is true that ESOP legislation
will increase savings tendencies among participants, it does so
only in a manner that creates a number of undesirable tax-
induced distortions in the behavior of firms.
To see how ESOP legislation fosters increased saving, con-
sider the behavior of a worker ("W") in the absence of taxes.
Suppose W, who has earned $100, is indifferent towards con-
suming now or at the end of time period one when his $100 will
have e"arned a ten percent rate of return, or ten dollars. An
income tax may distort W's marginal decision in favor of im-
mediate consumption.86 If W is subject to a fifty percent tax
rate, it will take $200 to cover W's consumption needs, but $200
is insufficient to produce $110 at the end of time period one,
because a tax is imposed on both the earning of the $200 and
the periodic payments accruing to the $100 saved or invested.
This payment of $200 to W will allow him to have only $105 at
the end of time period one. If he was indifferent before taxes,
W will now choose immediate consumption. Multiplying this
distortion by millions of taxpayers leads to less savings than is
optimal.
If W receives his compensation in the form of a contribution
to an ESOP of $200 worth of employer securities, W will owe
no taxes now, but will be fully taxed upon withdrawal at the
end of time period one. At a ten percent rate of growth and a
fifty percent tax rate, W will be taxed on $220 and will end up
with $110 for consumption purposes. Therefore, W will remain
indifferent between consumption now or consumption later. The
taxation of contributions to ESOPs is perfectly consonant with
85 See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
86 This static equilibrium model assumes that the imposition of a tax does not affect
interest rates. Changes in interest rates due to taxes can affect the amount of distortion.
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the basic principle of a consumption tax-to eliminate distor-
tions discouraging savings and investment.87
To the extent that the treatment of ESOPs moves the tax
system towards a consumption tax, it is likely to encourage
savings and investment. Indeed the Internal Revenue Code now
contains a welter of provisions that depart from strict income
tax principles. The deferred compensation provisions,88 the pro-
vision authorizing Individual Retirement Accounts,89 and the
accelerated depreciation provisions90 all head the current system
towards a consumption tax. The problem with this piecemeal
march towards a consumption tax is that, while the legislation
may redress some distortions, it creates others.91
Because ESOP legislation provides tax incentives when com-
pared with cash compensation and other pension plans, on the
margin we will observe firms setting up ESOPs where, in the
absence of tax incentives, compensation would not have been
paid with the employer's stock. In light of the Congressional
mandate for a variety of restrictions and rules before an ESOP
can qualify for preferential tax treatment, firms may alter their
behavior in order to comply.
ESOP provisions are only available to certain corporations.92
Businesses operated as partnerships or sole proprietorships can-
not avail themselves of the tax subsidized loan privileges avail-
able to an ESOP or the rollover privilege available to share-
holders on the sale of the employer's stock to an ESOP.93
Marginal firms that favored a noncorporate form of operation
before ESOP legislation may now favor incorporation even
though the corporate form may result in some deadweight loss
87 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401 (1982); see also supra note 21.
88 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 219 (1982).
89 See, e.g., id. § 168. .
90 See, e.g., id. § 167.
91 Commentators looking at our tax system inevitably find themselves confronting the
theory of "second best." Crudely summarized, the theory holds that since our tax
system is full of provisions that promote inefficiencies, it is impossible to prove that a
particular tax change that.would be more efficient in a vacuum will lead to greater
efficency in our actual crazy-quilted system. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The Gel/eral
Theory ofSecol/d Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956).
92 Because an ESOP by definition must invest in employer stock, only corporations
may establish ESOPs. See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1982). Even some corporations may be
precluded from creating an ESOP. For example, a subchapter S corporation will lose
its status if invested in by a trust. [d. § 1361(b)(I)(B). Professional corporations in most
states will be denied the ESOP route because of state laws prohibiting investment in
the corporation by nonprofessionals. See Kaplan & Ludwig, supra note I, at A·IO to
A-II.
93 I.R.C. § 4875(e)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
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to society.94 If this was the worst distortion caused by ESOP
legislation, the benefits of shifting towards a consumption tax
might outweigh any disadvantages. ESOP funding limitations,
however, cause more fundamental distortions.
The ceiling on contributions to an ESOP is measured by
employee compensation levels. An employer may deduct a max-
imum of twenty-five percent of an employee's annual compen-
sation.95 If the amount allocated to the account of a participant
exceeds the lesser of twenty-five percent annual compensation
or $30,000, the plan will be disqualified and will not be eligible
for favored tax treatment.96 Consider two firms, X Corp. and Y
Corp., each producing the same product, and facing identical
costs and prices in the market. They are identical in size and in
every other respect except that X Corp.'s production is labor
intensive while Y Corp. is capital-intensive.97 The tax advan-
tages associated with ESOPs, including the ability to borrow at
tax subsidized interest rates, will give the labor-intensive X
Corp. a decided advantage in the market.98
The distortion of ESOP legislation in favor of labor-intensive
firms results in the inefficient allocation of investments through-
out the economy. To the extent that larger firms achieve effi-
ciencies by using capital to reduce labor costs, ESOP legislation
subsidizes smaller, less efficient firms, thus causing overprod-
uction by labor-intensive firms and underproduction by capital-
intensive firms.99
94 See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 757-58 (1980). Deadweight loss is the
lost output created by not operating at laissez faire optimality due to taxation or some
other redistributive scheme.
9~ See supra note 50.
96 I.R.C. § 415(c)(I) (1982). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
97 To make the comparison complete, we should assume that Y Corp. uses capital
that has a one-year useful life and is therefore fully deductible in the same way as
compensation or that depreciation deductions accurately measure the decrease in value
of an asset with a life in excess of one year. But see Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note
91, at 12 (discussing the problem of second best).
9S Again there may be a problem of second best if current tax rules through accelerated
depreciation favor capital over labor. See id.
99 Congress was not totally oblivious to the distortions created by ESOP legislation
in favor of labor over capital. As part of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress
authorized an additional one percent investment tax credit if the company used its tax
savings to fund a specially defined type of ESOP known as a Tax Reduction Act Stock
Ownership Plan or TRASOP. See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301,
89 Stat. 26, 36-45. Congress destroyed TRASOPs in 1981. See Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 331,95 Stat. 172,289-96. Strong lobbying from labor
interests convinced Congress that TRASOPs wrongly favored capital intensive com-
panies. TRASOPs were replaced with PAYSOPs which offer a tax credit based on the
percentage of participants' compensation contributed to the plan. Id.
Congress's abdication of equal treatment for capital intensive firms may be temporary
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There is not much systematic, empirical evidence available
on ESOPs.loo Furthermore, the dramatic tax advantages created
by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984101 may significantly alter
the composition of firms availing themselves of ESOPs. What
evidence is available confirms our expectations. Based on 1~77
tax returns, over two-thirds of the ESOPs in existence were in
the trade/service and manufacturing sectors. 102 The evidence
suggests that the companies adopting ESOPs were small, labor-
intensive operations. Over eighty-three percent of the ESOPs
in 1977 had fewer than 250 employees, and over ninety percent
had fewer than 500 employees. 103 By comparison, of the 301
TRASOPs in existence in 1977, all had more than one hundred
participants ·and over sixty percent had one thousand or more
participants. 104 In contrast to ESOPs, over forty percent of the
TRASOPs were in the transportation/utilities industries with an
additional thirty-four percent in manufacturing. 105 These capital-
intensive industries benefited from TRASOP legislation, which
determined tax benefits on the basis of investment rather than
payroll. 106
Similar conclusions can be drawn from a 1983 study of ESOPs
conducted by an ESOP trade association. 107 The median number
of ESOP participants per firm responding to one survey was
182.108 Eighty-four percent of the firms responding were closely
held. l09 Light manufacturing firms constituted the largest single
if Senator Long has his way. "It is my hope that at some future date the Congress will
reexamine the investment tax credit area in light of our experience with ESOPs." 129
CONGo REC. SI6,629-38 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
100 Hoerr, supra note 3, at 94, 102-10.
101 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. See supra
notes 7, 9.
102 The empirical information that follows is taken from D. PECKMAN, supra note 11,
at 11-17. The statistics that follow are based on those plans with more than 100
participants.
103 [d. at 17. These figures reflect the 600 ESOPs with more than 100 participants. and
also the 1142 ESOPs with fewer than 100 participants. Interestingly, over 81% cfESOP
plans with more than 100 participants actually had over 2500 participants. This is becausc
a few very large corporations have adopted ESOPs. [d. at 18.
104 [d. at 16-17. Ninety percent of all TRASOP participants were in plans with morc
than 2500 participants. [d. at 17. .
105 [d. It is likely that TRASOPs were used by heavy manufacturers in view of the
larger number of participants per TRASOP as compared with ESOPs. [d.
106 See I.R.C. § 48(n) (1982), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369,98 Stat. 494 (for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983). See supra notc
99.
107 ESOP SURVEY 1983, supra note 19.
103 [d. at 8.
109 [d. at 11.
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line of business for firms with ESOPs.l1o Moreover, the highest
percentages of employee ownership were present in light man-
ufacturing and construction, typically labor-intensive activi-
ties. 11l Heavy manufacturers with ESOPs tended to have smaller
proportions of employee ownership,112 perhaps reflecting their
capital intensive nature. .
B. ESOPs Enhance Employee Productivity
It is clear that employee productivity significantly influences·
a firm's profitability.1l3 If worker productivity in a particular
firm goes up, then, all else being equal, the value of that firm
will rise relative to the value of other firms. Seen in this way,
the issue of whether ESOPs increase worker motivation and
productivity is essentially an empirical question. 114
The theoretical justification for the notion that ESOPs in-
crease employee productivity is straightforward-stockholders
want the value of the firms in which they own stock to go up.
As stockholders, employees of firms with ESOPs in theory will
work harder so the value of their investment will increase. 115
A number of empirical studies have attempted to measure the
effects of ESOPs on employee productivity. 116 While ESOP pro-
110 Light manufacturing businesses comprised 28% of the 229 respondents. Id. at 7.
111 Id. at 6. The survey measured only ownership by the ESOP. The findings do not
reflect ownership by employees investing in the firm on their own. Id.
112Id.
II) See Hennessee, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and the Publicly Held Corpo-
ration, 27 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 167, 184 (1978).
114 It is well established that the best way to measure the effects of a particular event
on a firm is to compare the firm's stock performance before and after the particular
event. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & J. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 266-
81 (1984). If ESOPs increase worker motivation and productivity, then the implemen-
tation of ESOPs should have a positive effect on the share prices of firms implementing
such plans, aU else equal. Empirical studies of the stock prices of firms that have
adopted ESOPs are likely to be unreliable, however, because any increase in share
value may to be attributable to the tax advantages given to such plans rather than to
the effect on worker productivity. As a result, the empirical studies on the effects of
ESOPs on worker productivity have by necessity used empirical standards inferior to
stock performance. In these studies, the effect of ESOPs on such factors as the firms'
earnings, cash flow and book value have been examined. But because of differences in
accounting techniques among firms, studies based on such accounting data are inherently
unreliable.
115 See 129 CONGo REC. SI6,629, SI6,630-31 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of
Sen. Long) (describing the purported gains in productivity and work force morale that
aUegedly flow from the implementation of ESOPs).
116 See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U. S., REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE: EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: WHO BENEFITS MOST IN CLOSELY
HELD COMPANIES? (1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U. S.];
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ponents have pointed to some of this research as providing
compelling evidence that ESOPs are a proven success at raising
worker morale, motivation, and output,117 a more balanced view
recognizes that "there has been no conclusive evidence . . .
indicating that ESOPs serve as powerful employee motivators
or effective productivity enhancers."118 In evaluating the empir-
ical work in this area, it is important to note both the tentative
nature of the research119 as well as the directly opposing con-
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICH-
IGAN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP; A REPORT TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMIN-
ISTRATION (1978), reprinted in The Small Business Employee Ownership Act: Hearings
on S. 388 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
152,218 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER]; THE U. S. RAILWAY
ASS'N, AN EVALUATION OF THE EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN AS ApPLIED TO
CONRAIL (1975), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 15, at 653, 712; Conte & Tannen-
baum, Employee Owned Companies: Is the Difference Measurable?, M. L. R., July
1978, at 23, 27; Livingston & Henry, The Effect ofEmployee Stock Ownership Plans
on Corporate Profits, 47 J. RISK & INS. 491, 501 (1980); Marsh & McAllister, ESOPs
Tables: A Survey of Companies with Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L.
551,620 (1981); Swad, Some Empirical Evidence on the Impact ofESOPs on Company
Operating Performance, 29 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 751, 757 (1981).
117 See, for example, Sen. Long's glowing account of productivity gains in companies
that have adopted ESOPs: "On the basis ofthe research to date, it is clear that companies
with employee ownership are likely to be more productive and more profitable than
those without, and the more ownership held by employees, the better the performance
of the company." 129 CONGo REC. SI6,629, S16,631 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement
of Sen. Long).
118 D. PECKMAN, supra note 11, at 43.
119 Thus one study seemed to make a highly favorable assessment of a particular
ESOP, only to conclude that:
[i]t is not possible in this preliminary analysis, however, to provide a definitive
explanation of this [company's] recovery or to attach specific weight to the
ownership plan itself. Some of the data do indicate that the plan is having
positive effects, both direct and indirect. Yet the company has operated during
earlier periods (prior to 1969) at levels of profitability as high if not higher than
current levels. Furthermore, we cannot say on the basis of this limited analysis
that the company is performing better (or worse) than other traditionally owned
companies in its industry.
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 116, at 218-19. Regarding its "finding" that
ESOPs are associated with higher productivity, this study noted that: "[t]he firms for
which we have measures of profit may be select and our analyses are based on correl-
ations that illustrate associations among variables; they do not prove causation," Id. at
218-19. This study has, nonetheless, been cited as providing firm empirical support for
the ESOP cause. See 129 CONGo REC. SI6,629, S16,631 (daily ed. Nov. 17. 1983)
(statement of Sen. Long).
Research data for several purportedly supportive studies was compiled by mailed
questionaires. Conte & Tannenbaum, supra note 116, at 27; Marsh & McAllister, supra
note 116, at 588; Swad, supra note 116, at 753. Firms of course were free to respond
or not as they chose. This raises the possibility ofa 'nonresponse bias' if the respondents
are not representative of the group as a whole. See Swad, supra note 116, at 756. It
stands to reason that those firms which were more hopeful and enthusiastic about
achieving productivity gains through an ESOP would be more likely to respond to such
a survey, since, in all probability, only those firms would have attempted to monitor
any resulting fluctuations in worker output. Furthermore, "as of the end of 1980, no
complete listing (governmental or otherwise) of all companies that have adopted an
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elusions arrived at by different studies. 120 To the extent that
validity can be granted to their findings, several studies show a
wide variation in the suitability of ESOPs for different indus-
tries. 121 This makes the wisdom of using tax incentives to en-
courage all firms to set up ESOPs-regardless of their line of
business-seem dubious at best.
Although ESOPs might appear to raise productivity in certain
firms or industries according to some studies, this does not
establish that ESOPs are a more efficient method of motivating
employees than other worker incentive plans. On the face of it,
the argument that an ESOP will necessarily enhance worker
productivity is flawed. In firms with ESOPs, the benefit to be
derived from an employee's increased productivity does not
flow directly to the employee. Any marginal increase in the
value of the firm's stock must be shared equally by all of the
firm's shareholders. Furthermore, the allocation of stock con-
tributed to an ESOP is not adequately linked to the specific
effort of an employee. In a typical ESOP, this allocation is based
on employee compensation-a factor that does not accurately
reflect individual productivity. In such a plan, stock is allocated
to employees ex ante on the basis of their base salary, and not
on the basis of their relative contribution to the firm ex post.
As such, any incentive effect of the ESOP is minimized. By
working harder, an individual employee:
will get only a minute share of the gain from this action. The
very fact that the objective or interest is common to or
ESOP had been compiled. Without such a listing it is nearly impossible to identify an
unbiased survey sample." Marsh & McAllister, supra note 116, at 588.
120 A study conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Mich-
igan found that companies with ESOPs were more profitable than those without. SURVEY
RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 116, at 156-57. However, this finding has been flatly
contradicted by more recent research. A survey of 102 firms found that ESOP companies
were less profitable than non-ESOP companies. See Livingston & Henry, supra note
116, at 501 - 02. Compare Marsh & McAllister, supra note 116, at 619 (increase in
productivity) with COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 116, at 37 (no
meaningful evidence of increased productivity). Moreover, a company might show
higher profits after adopting an ESOP because of the tax advantages associated with
the plan rather than as a consequence of enhanced worker productivity.
121 Thus, one study noted that both utilities as well as companies and firms engaged
in wholesale trade that had adopted ESOPs showed substantially higher increases in
productivity than did those firms in the same line of business that had not done so.
However, firms with ESOPs in the services, mining and construction industries showed
substantially greater decreases in productivity than did their counterparts without
ESOPs. Marsh & McAllister, supra note 116, at 615. Another study concluded that "the
statistics (on company operating performance) are encouraging for manufacturers and
processors. They offer no encouragement for other types of firms." Swad, supra note
116, at 757.
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shared by the group entails that the gain from any sacrifice
an individual makes to serve this common purpose is, shared
with everyone in the group.... [T]he individual in any large
group with a common interest wiII reap only a minute share
of the gains from whatever sacrifices the individual makes
to achieve this common interest. 122
This phenomenon is known to economists as the free rider
problem. 123 Because any gain from an individual employee's
increased efforts goes to everyone in the group, those who do
not work any harder after an ESOP is imposed will benefit from
any productivity increases just as much as those who do change
their work habits. If ESOP contributions could be structured so
as to favor particularly productive employees, these free rider
problems would be eliminated. Unfortunately, the anti-discrim-
ination philosophy that pervades the pension and profit-sharing
area prevent this. Eligibility must be broad,124 and allocations
of employer contributions to plan participants must be on the
basis of a pre-determined formula. 125
Employers who wish to increase productivity by providing
individualized incentives for productive workers must use a
compensation device other than an ESOP, because attempting
to reward particularly productive workers through an ESOP will
jeopardize the plan's tax favored status. 126 Thus, firms that adopt
ESOPs may not do so to promote productivity, but rather to
capture the tax benefits. 127 If ESOPs are to have the effect on
122 M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 18 (1982).
123 For a discussion of the free rider problem, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 351 (2d ed. 1977).
124 ESOPs must generally cover a minimum of 70% of all employees. See I.R.C.
§ 41O(b)(I)(A) (1982). An ESOP must be a defined contribution plan that is a qualified
stock bonus plan or a combination of a stock bonus plan and a money purchase plan.
See id. § 4975(e)(7). A qualified stock bonus plan must contain a "definite pre-determined
formula for allocating the contributions made to the plan among the participants." [d.
Contributions are also fixed under a money purchase plan. See Treas. Reg. 1.401-
1(b)(I)(i) to (iii) (1982).
125 See infra note 133.
126 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
127 On this point, as on so many others, the empirical literature is uncertain. See, e.g.,
supra note 119. The Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan found
that employers who had implemented ESOPs were heavily influenced in this decision
by their expectation that ownership would provide "an incentive for employees to work
harder," or at least more conscientiously. This factor appeared to weigh more heavily
than any other in the deliberations over whether to adopt an ESOP. SURVEY RESEARCH
CENTER, supra note 116, at 170-71. Ninety-four percent of the responding companies
in another survey believed that improving the productivity of employees was either a
"very important" or "somewhat important" motivation for adopting an ESOP. Marsh
and McAllister, supra note 116, at 602.
Other studies, however, 'have concluded that management is notably unimpressed
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productivity that their proponents hope for, the anti-discrimi-
nation requirements must be deleted.
The free rider problem associated with the imposition of
ESOPs may induce certain employees to work even less than
before in the hope that other (greedier) employees will work
harder and keep the overall wage level the same. An important
implication of this is that the free rider problem becomes more
acute in larger firms than in smaller firms. 128 As a firm becomes
larger, the effects of increased efforts onthe part ofan individual
employee become smaller. As such, all else being equal, we
would expect larger firms to be less likely to develop ESOPs
and instead to search for alternative schemes for compensating
employees. 129 Empirical observation does not refute the free
rider argument; not only does the incidence of ESOPs decline
as firm size increases, but the extent of employee coverage
"tends to decrease as company size increases."l3o
with the motivational potential of ESOPs. Only six percent of the respondents in ol\e.
survey "felt that ESOPs were 'very important' in increasing productivity," while 59%
either felt that ESOPs were "not too important" or of no consequence whatsoever in
this regard. WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC., EMPLOYER ATTITUDES TOWARD COMPENSA-
TION AND EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY 12-17 (1980). Another study concluded that "most
employers were not primarily concerned with ESOPs as a tool for enhancing employee
morale or increasing productivity," noting that "[e]mployers had not attempted to de-
termine what impact the ESOP was having on employees and could not provide any
measure of increased productivity resulting from the plans." COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE U.S., supra note 116, at 39, 42.
128 While the free rider problem limits the effectiveness of ESOPs as a means of raising
worker productivity within large companies, various other features of these plans make
ESOPs unsuitable for a broad range of other firms as well. For example, in 1975 the
U.S. Railway Association commissioned a report to determine whether an ESOP should
be formed for the employees of the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). That study
recommended against the adoption ofa plan, noting that a sizable proportion of Conrail's
employees were over the age of50. The report cited motivational research demonstrating
"that older employees tend to be more interested in retirement income than in capital
accumulation," and concluded that "the ideal situation for implementation of an ESOP
is one in which [among other factors] ... [t]he employee group is either heavily weighted
with younger employees or only lightly weighted with older employees." U.S. RAILWAY
ASS'N, supra note 116, at 692, 697.
129 See Hennessee, supra note 113, at 168.
To date, the majority of the firms that have adopted ESOPs are smaller, closely
held firms. If ESOPs are going to have any effect on the economy and the
nation, large publicly held corporations will have to adopt them. This is where
the majority of the nation's wealth is held. Therefore, if ESOPs are to make a
significant contribution to the economy's capital needs, they will have to be
attractive to large publicly held corporations.
[d.
130 Marsh & McAllister, supra note 116, at 591-92. Only 15% of the private companies
in this survey employed more than 500 workers, although private companies accounted
for 81% of the firms in the total sample. [d. at 589-92. See also supra text accompanying
notes 103 and 108.
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Shareholders have strong incentives to increase the produc-
tivity of the employees in the firms they control. 131 Shareholders
will be expected to invest in greater productivity until the cost
of such investment is equal to the benefit to be derived from
the increased output. Without the aid of tax incentives, the
market has developed numerous methods of inducing workers
to increase productivity.132 Those compensation methods that
tailor compensation to individual productivity are more suc-
cessful than those that do not. To the extent that the tax system
favors ESOPs as opposed to these other methods, particularly
those that really do reward productivity, economic distortions
are created.
There are significant efficiency costs to a regulatory system
that exalts one particular market solution over others. The mar-
ket mechanism itself is a discovery process. 133 Even if the pro-
ponents of ESOPs are correct that employees need a stronger
sense of association with the firms where they work, the inter-
vention of the state serves as an imperfect substitute for the
'"131 See, e.g., A. SZILAGYI & M. WALLACE, READINGS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV-
IOR AND PERFORMANCE (3d. ed. 1983); M. BEER, B. SPECTOR, P. LAWRENCE, D. MILLS
& R. WALTON, MANAGING HUMAN ASSETS (1984) [hereinafter cited as BEER &
SPECTOR].
132 For instance, executive compensation plans designed to encourage managers to
maximize their firms value are both "wide-spread and becoming more popular. In 1970,
65% of medium-size and larger U.S. manufacturing companies had annual bonus plans,
while in 1980, 90% of these firms had such plans." Smith & Watts, Incelll;ve and Tax
Effects ofExecutive Compensation Plans, AUSTL. J. OF MGMT., Dec. 1982, 139, at 140.
The many management incentive plans in place in American industry today include:
bonus plans, stock options, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock plans, phantom
stock plans, dividend units, etc. Id. at 140-43. For other workers there are a panoply
of merit salary increases, piece rate incentive systems, individual bonus plans, sales
commission schedules and profit sharing plans. BEER & SPECTOR, supra note 131, at
139-46. The considerable amount of experimentation and diversity in this area plainly
belies the impression many ESOP proponents give that firms must be bludgeoned into
adopting programs that are designed to increase employee productivity. See, e.g., Marsh
& McAllister, supra note 116, at 554. "[Tlhousands of additional companies must be
coaxed into either adopting an ESOP or expanding an existing one" if the "ambitious
goals" of ESOP proponents for "improving the American economic system" are to be
met.ld.
133 Perhaps the best known exposition of this view is to be found in the works of
Friedrich A. Hayek. See F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER
(1948); THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); 1 RULES AND ORDER (LAW LEGISLA-
TION AND LIBERTY) (1973); See also 1. Kirzner, ElItrepreneurship, Choice and Freedom,
in PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY, AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP 225, at 238 (1979).
The market process allows for a much greater use of information, as individual
producers, consumers, suppliers, and financiers, etc., are left free to act on the knowl-
edge that is available to them, adapting to changing circumstances as they judge best.
Thus, new product lines will be introduced, new financing arrangements will be devised
and more effective employee incentive plans will be implemented as the need arises.
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spontaneous market process of discovery. The market process
is likely to produce the best method for compensating workers.
The preferential tax treatment afforded to ESOPs "may generate
new (unintended and undesired) processes of market adjust-
ments that produce a final outcome even less preferred than
might have emerged in the free market. "134 This distortion of
the normal process by which alternative incentive systems are
developed will penalize the more innovative firms that. might
develop new, as yet unthought of, incentive systems. It will also
harm those larger firms for which ESOPs are less attractive than
alternative systems. These larger firms benefit less from the
favorable treatment given ESOPs than do smaller firms. These
smaller firms in tum may have adopted ESOPs of their own
volition, without the need for tax incentives. Some larger firms,
even in the face of tax advantages, might prefer bonus plans or
other methods of incentive compensation. To give ESOPs fa-
vorable treatment is to give a regulatory preference to those
firms that have a comparative advantage in offering ESOPs.
Presumably even those who believe that the market system-
atically undercompensates workers would prefer that the most
efficient alternatives available be used to correct this market
failure. But ESOPs are a particularly inefficient method of cor-
recting undercompensation.
C. Employees Want Stock Ownership in Their Employers
Underlying ESOP legislation is an unspoken assumption that
employees want to hold their employer's stock as part of their
portfolios. However, absent distortions created by the tax sys-
tem, employees would not be likely to invest a substantial por-
tion of their earnings in the firm for which they work. This stems
from the fact that "investors, though seeking high expected
returns, generally wish to avoid risk."135 The evidence of inves-
tor risk aversion is "overwhelming."136 Assuming that employ-
ees, when acting as investors, will not prefer taking risks to any
134 I. Kirzner, The Perils of Regulation: A Market Process Approach 13 (Law and
Economics Center, University of Miami School of Law, Occasional Paper, 1978).
13S J. LORlE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 171
(1973).
136 [d. For example, it is commonplace that investors receive a lower rate of return
on bonds than they do on common stock that they might own in the same company. R.
POSNER, supra note 123, at 320.
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greater extent than other investors, portfolio theory strongly
suggests that rational investors will prefer diversified portfolios
of securities to portfolios that are not diversified. 137 This fact is
so well established that as a general rule, pension fiduciaries
are required to diversify the holdings they control. 138 However,
not only are ESOPs exempt from the fiduciary duty to diversify,
ESOP trustees are forbidden to diversify. 139 ESOPs must "invest
primarily in qualifying employer securities" in order to qualify
for tax favored status. 140
Portfolio theory'41 can be easily summarized. 142 The two saM
lient features of any investment portfolio are its expected return
and its riskiness. I43 If all else is equal, investors will maximize
return for a given level of risk and minimize risk for a given
level of return. 144 The implication of Markowitz's work is that
it is possible to construct efficient portfolios based on three
factors; (1) the expected return of every security; (2) the vari-
ance (or standard deviation) of each return from the mean return
of all investments; and (3) the relationship between the return
for each individual security and the return for all securities. 14s
Building on Markowitz's work, later financial economists rec-
ognized the importance of distinguishing between the two types
of risk that are associated with stock ownership. 146 Non-system-
atic or firm-specific risk refers to risk associated with a particular
firm. 147 The prospect that a firm's product will become obsolete,
or that its managers will steal from the corporate coffers are
examples of firm-specific risk. Systematic, or non-firm-specific
risk refers to risk associated with the market generally.148 Con-
'37 See Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
138 ERISA, supra note 21, at § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(C).
'39 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
140 I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7)(A) (1982). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
14' See supra note 137. Portfolio theory has its origins in this celebrated article.
142 For an overview of portfolio theory, see generally R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 101-09 (2d ed. 1983); R. BREALEY & S.
MEYERS, supra note 114, at 117-56; H. LEVY & M. SARNATT, PORTFOLIO AND IN-
VESTMENT SELECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1984); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON,
supra note 135, at 171-266; MANAGING INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS: A DYNAMIC PROCESS
(J. Maginn & D. Tuttle eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as MANAGING INVESTMENT PORT-
FOLIOS]; R. POSNER, supra note 123, at 315-26.
143 J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 135, at 172.
..... Id. at 173.
14S Id. at 172.
146 For a discussion of the concepts of systematic and non-systematic risk, sec Mo-
digliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68 (1974).
147 Id. at 76.
'48Id.
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tractions in the money supply and uncontrolled government
spending are examples of market risk. Non-systematic risk can
be eliminated by diversification. 149 Empirical studies on the re-
lationship between diversification and risk further suggest that
rational investors will diversify; for example, a ten stock port-
folio will reduce investor risk by eighty-seven percent as' com-
pared to a one stock portfolio. 150
There is no meaningful justification for the requirement that
ESOPs invest primarily in employer securities. One possible
explanation for the existence of the requirement is that those
who crafted ESOP legislation wanted to increase employee mo-
tivation by giving employees an ownership stake in the future
of their firm. 151 Given the free rider problems associated with
such motivational schemes, however, this explanation is unsa-
tisfying. 152 As explained above, if employee stock ownership
was such an effective way of improving worker motivation,
there would be no need to promote the concept through the tax
system. 153
Another explanation is that the investment requirements are
designed to force employers to share ownership with employ-
ees. 154 Yet the need for employees to diversify their investments
as do other investors is particularly acute because so much of
their economic well-being is already tied exclusively to the firm
for which they work. Employees are unable to diversify away
the risk to their employment that unforeseen developments will
threaten the viability of the firm for which they work. All em-
ployees, especially executives and managers, "are undiversified
risk bearers who invest their services in only one firm at a
time. "155 Because of the simple inability of people to work for
more than one firm at a time and the tendency of workers to
develop industry-specific and often firm-specific skills, corpo-
149 See Ambachtsheer & Ambrose, Basic Financial Concepts: Return and Risk, in
MANAGING INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS, supra note 142, at 47. "As more securities are
added to the portfolio, total risk falls at a decreasing rate. At the limit, unsystematic
risk becomes zero (because of perfect diversification) and the only risk remaining is
that associated with the market in genera!." See also Modigliani & Pogue, supra note
146, at 78.
ISO R. BREALEY & S. MEYERS, supra note 114, at 112.
lSI See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
IS2 See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
IS) See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
IS4 See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
ISS Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1984).
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rate employees are especially inefficient risk bearers. 156 It is far
more efficient to place the firm-specific risks associated with
stock ownership in the hands of those who are able to minimize
such risk through diversification. Thus, there is a compelling
need for corporate employees to diversify their investment hold-
ings away from the firm and industry to which their human
capital is tied.
All of this is another way of saying that where an ESOP holds
an undiversified portfolio of employer stock for the benefit of a
firm's employees, that stock is worth less to the employees than
the same amount of the stock would be worth in the hands of
investors who are able to diversify. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that substantial tax subsidies are needed to induce workers
to accept compensation through an ESOP. Thus a major distor-
tion created by the favored treatment given ESOPs is the shift
away from the natural market bias towards diversified
portfolios.
D. ESOPs Promote Wealth Redistribution
ESOPs are expected to transform the United States into a
more productive and more egalitarian country. Proponents wish
to rectify the current distribution of stock ownership in this
country, where less than ten percent of the United States pop-
ulation holds over seventy percent of the market value of indi-
vidually owned stoCk. 157 ESOPs are touted as a mechanism for
renouncing the "Nation's crippling legacy of concentrated
ownership. "158
However, even putting aside the effects of any production
distortions caused by ESOPs, it is not clear in what direction
ESOP legislation redistributes wealth. Any wealth transfer gen-
erated by ESOP tax benefits is not a direct transfer from share-
holders to workers, but rather comes from taxpayers in general
and flows to a variety of advantageously situated parties. Since
the beneficiaries of ESOPs often may be a firm's more affluent
employees, the wealth transfer may be from less wealthy tax-
payers to more wealthy employees, thereby leading to a greater
concentration of wealth.
IS6Id. at 871.
157 129 CONGo REC. S16,630 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long (D·
La.».
IS8Id.
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A second, related problem occurs because managerial agents,
such as ESOP trustees, are able to use ESOPs for their own
ends rather than for the benefit of their principals, the employee-
shareholders. 159 Typically, market forces do much to align the
interests of principals with the interests of their agents, but the
high costs of monitoring and evaluating managerial performance
prevent "anything like a total convergence of interest" between
agents and principals. 160 This gap between the interests of agents
and their principals is known as "agency cost. "161 Top echelon
managers inevitably will have their own reasons for establishing
ESOPS,162 which may be unrelated to the interests of either the
employees or the shareholders. The implication is that the es-
tablishment of an ESOP may not benefit the employees who are
the ostensible beneficiaries of the plan. 163 Rather, an ESOP is
more likely to benefit both incumbent management, who can
use the plans to fend off unfriendly acquirors, and selling share-
holders, who can take advantage of rollover provisions to delay
IS? See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text.
160 Kraakman, supra note 155, at 863. Kraakman also states:
[U]nless these managers are also principal shareholders, their interests will not
dovetail with those of the shareholders. Managers' interests will instead depend
on the corporation's return to their own specialized 'investment' of time, skill
and reputation. Thus, managers will manage with an eye to increasing their
own expected utility by maximizing future compensation including salary, job
tenure, promotion prospects, informal perquisites, and opportunities for con-
suming leisure and other goods on the job.
[d.
161 Jensen and Meckling define agency cost as "the sum of: (1) the monitoring expen-
ditures by the principal," Le., the costs involved in "measuring or observing the behavior
of the agent," as well as "efforts on the part of the principal to 'control' the behavior
of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.;"
(2) "the bonding expenditures by the agent," those resources expended by the agent "to
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal, or to
ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions;" and (3) "the
residual loss," the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the
principal due to ... [the] divergence between the agent's decisions and those decisions
which would maximize the welfare of the principaL" Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EeON.
305, 308 (1976).
162 See Carlson, ESOP and Universal Capitalism, 31 TAX L. REV. 289, 294-95 (1976).
163 One commentator concluded:
It is evident that the employee stock ownership plan as conceived by Kelso is
designed primarily for the benefit of the employer-corporation. Its main func-
tion is to permit the employer to obtain the use of employee trust funds on
highly favorable terms. ESOP proponents also invariably stress the"many ways
in which an employee stock ownership plan can be exploited to accomplish
the business and financial objectives of management and stockholders; benefits
for employees, if mentioned at all, are viewed as at best incidental and at worst
an annoying necessity.
Carlson, supra note 162, at 294-95.
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paying capital gains tax. l64 This agency cost problem is magni-
fied because many of those affected by the plan have no say in
whether the plan is established. 165 While employees are free to
leave firms that shift wage payments from cash to stock own-
ership through ESOPs, the non-diversifiable, firm-specific hu-
man capital investments that employees frequently make impose
heavy costs on those employees who wish to leave. These
"agency cost" aspects of ESOPs all combine to exacerbate the
distortion caused by the tax system and negate the attempt to
use ESOPs as a wealth transfer device.
The above concerns are best illustrated by the use of ESOPs
in leveraged buyouts, where an investor (often existing manage-
ment) acquires a controlling interest in a company through the
use of borrowed money. The lender generally requires the bor-
rower to pledge as collateral for the loan the assets of the firm
whose shares are being acquired. 166 When firm management
arranges for the company ESOP (which management may ef-
fectively control)167 to make the acquisition, serious conflicts
between the public shareholders and the employees can arise.
The leveraged buyout of the Parsons Corporation by its ESOP
illustrates this confIict. 168 The Parsons ESOP borrowed
$518 million to purchase all of the outstanding Parsons stock for
$32.00 per share. 169 Prior to the buyout, the company was pub-
licly held, but insiders owned substantial blocks of stock. The
current employees acquired ownership of the firm through the
ESOP; however, these employees were not even entitled to vote
on the proposed buyout. Such a vote is required only if the
ESOP owns a majority of the stock in the company.170
At the time of the leveraged buyout, the firm's stock was
trading for $27.50 on the New York Stock Exchange. 17I Mr.
William E. Leonard, the firm's chairman, received $5.6 million
for his 175,207 shares. The leveraged buyout resulted in total
164 See infra notes 185-230 and accompanying text.
165 Neither ERISA nor any other regulations require shareholder approval for creating
an ESOP. See I.R.C. § 422A(b)(I) (1982).
166 For a description of a typical transaction, see Ronan, supra note 1, at 118.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 168-75.
168 Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
169Id.
170 I.R.C. § 409(e)(3) (West Supp. 1985). See Ronan, supra note I, at 129. This fact
further undercuts the argument of ESOP proponents that these plans give employees
more control over the firms for which they work. For proposed changes in this area,
see infra text accompanying notes 245-55.
171 Wall St. J., supra note 168, at 4, col. 1.
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payments to company executives of $19 million. 172 Several em-
ployee groups have filed formal complaints with the Labor De-
partment charging that under the plan the employees were
forced to acquire ownership of the company.173 As disenfran-
chised owners, these employees will have all of the risks of
ownership but no voice in how the company will be run. 174
As the Parsons situation illustrates, leveraged buyouts by
ESOPs are extra-market transactions which provide the em-
ployee-purchasers with none of the safeguards inherent in typ-
ical going-private transactions. Where, as in the Parsons trans-
action, the management trustees are also large shareholders (or
are influenced by large shareholders), conflicts of interest cannot
be avoided. The management trustees are causing the ESOP to
purchase their stock at above-market prices, frequently to avoid
being taken over by rival management teams.
In the absence of market forces, the only protection given to
ESOP participants is the fiduciary duty owed by the manage~
ment trustees to the purchasing employees. 175 But in the case
of ESOPs, even this ad hoc protection has been significantly
reduced. Fiduciary duties prohibit most pension plans from pur-
chasing stock from interested parties such as employers, major
shareholders, officers and directors. 176 Such restrictions, which
are part of the general fiduciary rules of ERISA, would prevent
ESOPs from engaging in leveraged buyouts, but are inapplicable
to ESOPS.177 This ESOP exemption is justified by ESOP sup-
porters as facilitating transfers of stock ownership from the
current owners to workers. 178 This Article suggests that this
exemption is harmful to the economic interests of the very
employees it ostensibly benefits. 179
There is a third reason to doubt that ESOPs are an effective
means to redistribute wealth. Because large publicly held cor-
porations are less likely to have ESOPs than small closely held




175 See ERISA, supra note 21, at § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1l04(a) (1982) (containing
codified fiduciary standards).
176 See ERISA, supra note 21, at §§ 406(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1l06(a), (b) (1982).
177 See ERISA, supra note 21, at §§ 404(a)(2), 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1l04(a)(2),
1l07(d)(3) (1982).
178 See supra hotes 38-41 and accompanying text.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 159-77.
lEO See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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ployees hands as a result [of ESOPs]. More probably the effect
will simply be to lighten the income tax burden of the corpora-
tions involved and that of their shareholders and executives, at
the expense of the rest of US."181
Because ESOPs may well protect the interests of managers
and more affluent employees rather than those rank and file
workers, these devices should prove to be a far less important
vehicle for reallocating wealth than advocates claim, despite
considerable regulatory support.
E. ESOPs Preserve Businesses and Jobs
If the present value of a firm's future income stream is less
than its asset value on liquidation (accounting for liquidation
costs), it is inefficient to artificially prop up these companies.
Society would be better off if the assets of such companies
could be redeployed. To the extent it prevents such firms from
failing or workers from losingjobs, ESOP legislation perpetuates
another market distortion. ESOP defenders, though, often credit
ESOP legislation for saving firms and preserving jobs, as when
the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Economic Stabi-
lization opened proceedings on ESOPs by commenting that
"[t]his morning's subcommittee hearing is for the purpose of
learning about employee-owned companies and particularly
about companies which would have shut down had the employ-
ees not purchased them and kept them operating."182 The sub-
committee then heard testimony on the use of ESOPs to bail
out companies whose market value as going concerns was less
than their asset values on liquidation. One such story involved
the South Bend Lathe Company, on the verge of liquidation,
which was purchased by its employeesthrough an ESOP. 183 The
purchase was made possible with the help of a $5,000,000 loan
from the federal government to the ESOP at a highly subsidized
three percent interest rate. 184
Similarly, the Canterbury Printing Company established an
ESOP which purchased all of the stock from its one hundred
181 Carlson, supra note 162, at 314.
182 Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Sta-
bilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1979) (opening remarks of Chairman Moorehead (D-Pa.» [hereinafter cited
as Subcomm. Hearing].
183 [d. at 4-9.
184 [d. at 5.
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percent owner. 185 As Senator Long commented, "As is often the
case, Mr. West was looking for a way to reward his many loyal
employees who might otherwise have lost their position by a
sale to another entity."186 Why would the employees have lost
their jobs upon a sale? Would they be replaced by more efficient
workers? Even if that was the case, there may be little objection
to continued inefficiency if the workers were willing to subsidize
their own inefficiency by accepting lower wages or a lower
return on their investment. But objections should arise when
the inefficiency is subsidized by other taxpayers through ESOP
tax incentives. 187
For example, Rath Packing Company, a nationally known
meatpacker specializing in pork products, lost over $20,000,000
during the 1970's. In order to remain competitive, Rath needed
$4,500,000 for modernization. An investor offered to purchase
the company, but the proposal would have required workers to
accept enormous wage and benefits cuts. As an alternative, the
union presented its own proposal to purchase the _company
through an ESOP. The purchase was coordinated with
$7,500,000 of subsidized government loans. While some tem-
porary wage concessions were made, the union essentially
avoided market-required concessions through a combination of
direct governmental loan subsidies and indirect tax subsidies
provided by ESOP legislation. 188
In a dynamic economy, efficiency demands that some busi-
nesses should be liquidated because the assets of those busi-
nesses are more valuable in alternative uses. 189 For other firms,
greater efficiency will be achieved by selling the business to new
owners who will make changes, including, in some cases, firing
185 The loan was made indirectly from the federal government through the City of
South Bend to the South Bend Lathe Company. As part of the plan, the Economic
Development Administration made a $5,000,000 grant to the City of South Bend. Id. at
5.
186 129 CONGo REC. S5836 (daily ed. May 3, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
187 To the extent that ESOP participants are blessed with favorable tax treatment,
there will be a tax revenue shortfall that will burden taxpayers in general. See, e.g.,
Hearings, supra note 15, at 108. Another type of subsidization takes the form of
government loans at below market interest rates, such as the three percent rate grant
to South Bend Lathe Company. See Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 182, at 5.
IBS This account is drawn from Olson, Union Experiences with Worker Ownership:
Legal and Practical Issues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases and Co-
operatives, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 729, 753-60 (1982). The article contains similar rescue
tales for a variety of companies including Chrysler, Ford, and Pan Am. See id. at 772-
80.
189 V. BRUDNEY AND M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FI-
NANCE 3-6 (1979).
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workers or cutting wages. These facts have not escaped Senator
Long,190 yet he still attempts to justify ESOP legislation as nec-
essary for workers and communities who "must cope with swol-
len welfare rolls, and deficits, overburdened State and local
relief efforts ...."191 Thus, Senator Long champions ESOPs as
a governmental second best solution to a host of problems cre-
ated by other government subsidies.
Proponents of ESOP legislation seem trapped between the
recognition that the tax benefits often represent a wealth transfer
from taxpayers in general to those taxpayers who own and/or
work at inefficient firms and the belief that inefficiency is not
being subsidized:
[a] company that is not market responsive, a company that
cannot meet its competition and tum a profit should not put
its employees in the position of owning that company. ESOP-
type financing is not intended for losers. It is intended, how-
ever, for those losers and for those marginally profitable
firms who, with employee ownership, can become
winners. 192
Two difficulties arise with this reasoning: first, ESOP-type fi-
nancing may not be intended for losers, but it is available for
losers to perpetuate inefficiency; and second, if a loser can
become a winner through employee ownership or any other type
of change, there is no need for a tax incentive to bring the
change about.
That there will be no market for the stock of a truly profitable
company or that holders of such stock will be unable to borrow
in order to pay estate taxes seems a bit implausible. One expla-
nation may be that what proponents refer to as "profitable"
companies are not so regarded by the market. Proponents often
try to support this explanation by citing case studies showing
how ESOP-owned firms rose from the ashes to prosperity, but
counterexamples abound. Rath Packing Company's employee
buyout was attended by great publicity in 1980, but today the
\90 As Senator Long remarked,
Mr. President, as any free market economist will teU you, it is the essence of
capitalism to aUow-indeed, encourage-financial capital to seek its highest
return. It is this "invisible hand" that serves as the driving force of a market
economy. By that measure plant closings make perfectly good economic sense,
particularly to those financial managers hired to oversee that capital on their
behalf.
129 CONGo REC. S16,636 (daily ed. Nov 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long).
19\ [d. at SI6,637.
192 [d.
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company is undergoing bankruptcy reorganization in a Chapter
11 proceeding. 193 Even if some studies are true ex post, they do
not vindicate government intervention ex ante. Profitability and
efficiency are not necessarily synonymous. Simply stated, a firm
with assets that produce a five percent return on investment
uses those assets inefficiently if the assets can produce a nine
percent return in some alternative use. A firm that seems to be
profitable after an employee buyout may J).ot be sufficiently
profitable in the eyes of the market, given the risk level of the
firm's activities. Moreover, this "profitability" of ESOP-owned
firms is often purchased with the general taxpayers' dollars.
III. ESOPs AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
The market for corporate control, also known as the takeover
market, is the arena in which competing managerial teams vie
for the right to manage corporate resources. 194 Increasingly,
ESOPs are being adopted as a defensive technique by manage-
rial teams seeking to avoid takeovers. 195 This move clearly il-
lustrates that agency costs may allow management to manipulate
ESOPs in the interest of self-preservation but at the expense of
shareholders. 196
In an important review article,197 Michael Jensen and Richard
Ruback conclude on the basis of dozens of independent studies
that corporate takeovers "generate positive gains" and are there-
fore wealth-creating transactions. 198 A takeover can occur
193 Levin, supra note 3, at 30, col. 5.
194 The seminal article is Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73
J. POL. EeoN. 110 (1965); see also, McNider, What is a Tender Offer?, 37 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 908 (1980); supra text accompanying note 163.
195 See generally Brecher, Lazarus & Gray, The Function of Employee Retirement
Plans as an Impediment to Takeovers, 38 Bus. LAW. 503 (1983); Note, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans and Corporate Takeovers: Restraillts on the Use of ESOPs by Cor-
porate Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile Takeovers, 10 PEPPERDINE L. J. 731
(1983); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Other Defenses to Hostile Tender
Offers, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 580 (1982).
196 See supra text accompanying notes 161-76.
197 Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, II
J. FIN. EeoN. 5 (1983).
198 /d. at 47. On the basis of 13 studies, Jensen and Ruback concluded that "estimates
of positive abnormal returns to targets of successful tender offers in the month or two
surrounding the offer ... are uniformly positive ranging from 16.9% to 34.1%, and the
weighted average abnormal return ... is 20.1%." Id. at 10. Moreover, those returns
continued "through completion of the offers. Targets of unsuccessful tender offers earn
significantly positive abnormal returns on the offer announcement and through the
realization of the failure. However, those targets of unsuccessful tender offers that do
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through merger, tender offer or proxy contest. Sometimes ele-
ments of all three are involved in one corporate control trans-
action. 199 In many cases, a firm's incumbent management is not
willing to relinquish its managerial responsibilities and therefore
takes steps to ensure that the right to manage corporate re-
sources does not fall into the hands of a rival management team.
Where this is anticipated, the rival management team will most
likely launch a "hostile" tender offer for the shares of the firm
it wishes to manage.200 In these situations the target firm's man-
agement can use the ESOP to inhibit the rival firm from gaining
control.201 To a much lesser extent, the acquiring firm can use
the financing advantages available through ESOPs to make the
acquisition less costly}02
Tender offers can benefit shareholders of both the target and
the acquiring firm. The shareholders of the target benefit be-
cause they can sell their shares at a premium over the current
market price.203 The bidder's shareholders can benefit by ob-
taining the difference between the new value of the firm and the
payment to the old shareholders. The increases in wealth that
fuel the market for corporate control stem from two primary
sources. First, the target firm may be controlled by an inefficient
management team; when control shifts, the new management
not receive additional offers in the next two years lose all previous announcement gains,
and those targets that do receive new offers earn even higher returns." [d. at 15-16.
Finally, "[t]he abnormal returns for bidders in successful tender offers ... are all
significantly positive and range from 2.4% to 6.7%, with a weighted average return of
3.8%," while "the generally negative returns to unsuccessful bidders in both mergers
and tender offers are consistent with the hypothesis that mergers are positive net present
value projects." [d. at 16-22.
199 [d. at 6.
200 Where incumbent management does not wish to lose control, acquirors prefer
hostile tender offers to mergers because a merger requires approval of the target firm's
board of directors, while no such approval is needed for a tender offer. See, e.g.,
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 71 (merger), 79 (sale of assets) (1969); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets) (1983 & Supp. 1984).
Hostile tender offers are preferred over proxy fights because the latter are often
uneconomical:
Corporate law and economics combine to make the proxy fight an unattractive
... mechanism for displacing incumbent management. As a practical matter,
incumbent management may use corporate resources to resist the challenger's
candidacy. The challenger, however, must use its own funds, which are unlikely
to be reimbursed if the challenge fails.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 843 (1981)•
• 201 See infra text accompanying notes 216-38.
202 See infra text accompanying notes 239-44.
203 See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Response to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1981).
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team may more capably run the business.204 Second, synergy
gains may result from a combination of the particular assets of
the two firms. 205 In either case, the parties to the transaction
benefit, and society's resources are allocated in a more optimal
manner.
Managers of a firm that is the subject .of a takeover attempt
may take steps to avoid being acquired even when they believe
that the acquisition will be in the best interests of the share-
holders of the firm. This is because a frequent consequence of
a successful takeover attempt is the replacement of incumbent
managemenU06 Because there are "serious and unavoidable
conflicts of interest inherent in any decision on one's own
ouster," commentators have asserted that "courts ought not
make available to a manager resisting a tender offer-and, in
effect fighting against his own replacement-the same deference
accorded to the decisions of a manager in good standing."207
In spite of these conflicts of interest, courts generally invoke
the business judgment rule to shield the defensive conduct of
managers who fight against hostile tender offers.208 However,
204 See Manne, supra note 194, at 112.
While it is well established that the share prices of target companies rise after a
successful takeover, often quite dramatically, see supra note 198, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to isolate and identify all the causes for the increases in particular cases.
Nonetheless, a number of studies have concluded that "[t]he long history of negative
abnormal returns for . . . acquired firms is consistent with the hypothesis that these
firms had been poorly managed." Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and
Stockholder Returns 3 J. FIN. ECON. 715, 728 (1976); see also Asquith, Merger Bids,
Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51, 82-83 (1983); Maltesta,
The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective Functions of Merging Firms,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 155, 177-80 (1983).
To the extent, then, that an ineffective managerial group is able to entrench itself by
using an ESOP defensively, share prices are likely to decline.
2il5 One study concluded that "acquiring firms cannot theoretically and do not empir-
ically profit from the appreciation of the target shares;" instead, "control of the target
resources" is generally the object of corporate takeovers and the explanation for their
profitability. Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control,
53 J. Bus. 345, 351 (1980). Synergy gains in takeovers occur where joining the assets
of the target with the acquiring company results in the creation of a unit that is able,
for reasons of economies of cost and organization, to make greater use of the combined
corporate assets than was the case when the companies were separate. For a discussion
of these "synergies" in the context of one particular merger, see Ruback, The Conoco
Takeover and Shareholder Returns, 23 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 13,22-23 (1982).
206 Even managers who have been able to extract a commitment from the acquiring
firm of continued employment with the company will have strong incentives to resist a
takeover. These include the foreseeable loss of "power, prestige, and the value of
organization-specific human capital" for the old management team once the target firm
has been absorbed into another corporation. Jensen & Ruback, supra note 197, at 8.
2il7 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 203, at 1198.
203 The business judgment rule recognizes that courts generally are not competent to
make business decisions and that their involvement in the day-to-day running of firms
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this use of the business judgment rule has come under consid~
erable attack.209
There is much debate about which defensive tactics210 are
most appropriate to achieve the widely agreed upon goal of
maximizing shareholder and societal wealth. The best way to
achieve this goal is tQ ensure that neither side is given an in~
146
and corporations would, as such, be counterproductive for all concerned. See generally
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Lynch,
The Business Judgment Rule Reconsidered, 17 FORUM 452 (1981). Only when there is
evidence of self-dealing, or some other conflict of interest on a director's or officer's
part, will the business judgment rule give way to the stricter "duty of loyalty" standard,
which scrutinizes corporate officers' transactions with their companies to determine
whether they are "unfair to the corporation." See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?:
Conflict ofInterest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 43 (1966). One judicial
formulation of the rule provides that:
[d]irectors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties when in good faith
they exercise business judgment in making decisions regarding the corporation.
When they act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business
judgment, reposed in them as directors, which courts will not disturb if any
rational business purpose can be attributed to their decisions. In the absence
of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not
interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. III. 1980), aff'd, 646 F.
2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
For cases applying the business judgment rule to directors' actions in the corporate
control context, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (director's decision to resist tender offer, which would have
allowed target shareholders to sell their stock at a substantial premium, protected under
the presumption that corporate officers will act in good faith); Treadway Companies,
Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (director's issuance of corporate
stock to "white knight" not a breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of any affirmative
showing of bad faith); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3rd Cir. 1980) (decision
not to tender stock to minority shareholders, if at least arguably made for the benefit
of the corporation, protected under the business judgment rule).
209 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 203 at 1194-99; Easterbrook & Jarrell,
Do Targets Profit from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984); Gilson,
supra note 200, at 822-24; Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business
Judgment or Breach ofDuty?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51 (1982); Note, Tender Offer Decisions:
Effect of the Business Judgment Rule, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1122 (1981).
Influential commentators have stated that "every economically-sophisticated com-
mentator" has advocated the outright ban of defensive tactics. 1983 S.E.C. ADVISORY
COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS REP. OF RECOMMENDATIONS 70, 100 (separate statement
of Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell).
210 See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS:
DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING (1978); Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Take-
overs: Charter and By-law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979); Profusek, Tender
Offer Manipulation: Tactics and Strategies after Marathon, 35 Sw. L.J. 975 (1983);
Comment, A Review of the Literature on Defensive Tactics to Surprise Cash Tender
Offers, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 909 (1980); Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers
and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087
(1982); Comment, Corporate Takeover Battles-Shark-Repellent Charter and Bylaw
Provisions that Deter Hostile Tender Offers or Other Acquisitions-A Comprehensive
Examination, 27 How. L.J. 1683, 1708 (1984); Comment, Anti-takeover Maneuvers:
Developments in Defense Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw.L.J.
617,619 (1981).
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appropriate advantage over the other in a battle for control of a
corporation. The Williams Act,21l the major federal legislation
affecting tender offers, takes the position that there should be
a "level playing field" as between bidding firms and target firms.
Regardless of one's views as to the efficacy of such legislation,
it is agreed that the success or failure of takeover rules should
be judged on the basis of whether they achieve the goal of
evenhandedness.212
ESOPs may be used by corporations both as a "shield" to
counter unwanted takeover attempts213 and as a "sword" to
facilitate the acquisition of other firms.214 In either case, to the
extent that firms without ESOPs are on the other side of these
transactions, distortions inevitably arise. The remainder of this
Part evaluates more fully the nature of these distortions. Ana-
lyzing the tax provisions relating to ESOPs and observing how
ESOPs have been used in actual control transactions reveals
that ESOPs are significantly more valuable to incumbent man-
agement teams than to outsiders in battles for corporate control.
In this regard, the rules and practices relating to ESOPs are in
conflict with the general premise articulated in the federal &eO'
curities laws, that the legal system should not favor one group
over another in control transactions.215
A. ESOPs as a Shield
Perhaps the most obvious use of ESOPs in corporate control
transactions is by an incumbent management team that estab-
lishes an ESOP to acquire stock in its own firm for the purpose
211 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(g), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(g),
78n(d)-(f) (1982).
212 In its opinion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme
Court noted that in enacting the Williams Act, "Congress was indeed committed to a
policy of neutrality in contests for control," and held that the "sole purpose" of that
legislation "was the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender offer." Id.
at 29, 35. In Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Court re-emphasized that:
it is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investors
was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder .... As the
legislation evolved, therefore, Congress . . . expressly embraced a policy of
neutrality. As Senator Williams explained: "We have taken extreme care to
avoid tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bids."
Id. at 633.
213 See infra text accompanying notes 216-38.
214 See infra text accompanying notes 239-44.
21S See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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of thwarting the acquisition plans of an unwanted suitor. The
ESOP's acquisition of stock serves to dilute the voting strength
of the acquiror's block of stock and increases the amount of
stock an acquiror must acquire to obtain control.216 This strategy
is particularly attractive to management where there is signifi-
cant overlap between the board of directors of the target com-
pany and the trustees of the ESOP.217
The tax provisions associated with ESOPs make it possible
for firms to finance such stock acquisitions at subsidized rates.218
Institutional lenders extending loans to enable an ESOP to ac-
quire the employer's securities are allowed to exclude from
income fifty percent of the interest received on such loans.219
Consequently, the interest rate a lender charges an ESOP will
be lower than the rate charged for a comparable non-subsidized
acquiror, and the ESOP will have relatively more money to
spend on stock purchases.22o
The rollover provision of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984221
provides a particular advantage to the target firm. Prior to 1984,
any gain realized by a seller on the sale of employer securities
to an ESOP was taxed to the seller at normal capital gains
rates.222 The 1984 Act changed this to permit any person who
sells employer stock to an ESOP to elect to defer the capital
gain realized if the proceeds from the sale are used to acquire
the stock of a domestic corporation.223 This provision gives
target firms '!- clear advantage over rival bidders in the acquisi-
tion of shareholder stock. If an ESOP is willing to pay the exact
same price for stock as a rival bidder, selling shareholders will
elect to sell to the employer-controlled ESOP in order to defer
the payment of capital gains taxes. Even where the rival bidder
216 See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1975) (target
company guaranteed loan to ESOP that enabled ESOP to purchase 50,000 newly issued
shares, after offeror had obtained approximately 45% of target's stock); Texas Inter-
national Airlines, Inc. v. Continental Air Lines, No. 81-5514 (9th Cir., June 18, 1981)
(affirming denial of preliminary injunction; after offeror obtained 48.5% of the target
company's outstanding shares, the target set up an ESOP and guaranteed loans for it
up to $185 million for the purchase of newly issued stock).
217 See, e.g., Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463, 465-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd
as modified, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982).
218 See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
219 I.R.C. § 133(a) (West Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 58-59, 71-
72.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 58-59, 71-72.
221 I.R.C. § 1042 (West Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 54-55, 80.
212 I.R.C. §§ 61, 1202, 1222 (1982).
223 [d. §§ 1042 (a) and (c)(3) (West Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying note
55.
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is prepared to pay more for the stock, the preferred capital gains
treatment given to the ESOP's purchase may result in the rival,
which values the firm more, losing a control battle to the incum-
bent management team. Where this occurs, the favorable tax
treatment afforded ESOP purchases of employer stock results
in an inefficient allocation of resources.
While the rationale for the rollover provision was to shift the
ownership structure of corporations away from large individual
stockholders and towards ESOPs and worker control,224 an un-
intended consequence is strongly to favor incumbent manage-
ment in battles for corporate control. ESOPs could be encour-
aged to acquire employer stock without distorting the market
for corporate control simply by restricting favorable tax treat-
ment to sales of non-voting stock. In this way employees could
acquire an economic interest in the firm for which they work
without giving unwarranted advantages to incumbent manage-
ment. Such a rule would conform to many of the articulated
goals that underlie the favorable treatment given to ESOPs, but
would not distort the market for corporate control.225 Yet the
restrictions actually imposed on sales of employer stock to
ESOPs are precisely the opposite of those suggested here; de-
ferral of capital gains treatment is only permitted on employer
common stock that has voting power equal to or in excess of
that class of employer common stock that has the greatest voting
power.226 This voting provision exacerbates the distortions cre-
ated by the rollover provisions on the market for corporate
control.
Incumbent management also may use ESOPs to prevent loss
of control by causing the ESOP to make purchases of employer
stock well in advance of the announcement of a hostile tender
offer. If management creates an ESOP and it begins acquiring
stock after a hostile tender is launched, it seems particularly
likely that the purpose of the ESOP is to thwart a shift in control.
And where it can be shown that the primary purpose of the
ESOP is to evade a change or control, the ESOP will be struck
224 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83. Of course, allowing ESOPs to purchase
non-voting stock would not give employees any control over management of a company.
But the primary advantages of ESOPs cited by proponents occur by giving employees
a financial stake in the economic performance of a company, not by giving them voting
control. See id.
225 See supra notes 2, 82-83 and accompanying text.
226 I.R.C. §§ 1042(a)(l) and 409(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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down as a breach of the management's fiduciary duty of loyalty
to the shareholders.227
A graphic illustration of how ESOPs may be used in this
respect and how courts will treat such plans arose in Norlin v.
Rooney Pace.228 Piezo Electric Products, Inc. and Rooney Pace,
Inc. (piezo's investment banker) began buying large blocks of
stock in the Norlin Corporation. To prevent these firms from
gaining control of the corporation, Norlin created an ESOP and
caused it to purchase newly created Norlin common and pre-
ferred voting stock.229 The trustees of the ESOP were all mem-
bers of the Norlin board of directors, and voting control of the
ESOP was retained by the directors.23o In an action to enjoin
Norlin from voting the common stock, the Second Circuit re-
fused to accord the decisions made by Norlin the deference
typically given to managers under the business judgment rule
because the transaction was tainted by self-interest.231 Evidence
of management self-interest was found in the fact that the board
offered its shareholders no rationale for the transfers other than
its determination to oppose a shift in control at all costS.232 In
addition, the ESOP was created only five days after a district
court had refused to grant Norlin an injunction against further
stock purchases by Piezo, "at a time when Norlin's officers
were clearly casting about for strategies to deter a challenge to
their control. "233 As is typical in cases where the target firm
issues shares to an ESOP shortly after a challenge to corporate
control,234 the court found that the transfer of shares to the
ESOP "gives rise to an inference of improper motive."235
While actions taken subsequent to the tender offer are likely
to be struck down, "if actions can be taken prior to a tender
offer, the risk of such theories being successfully asserted can
227 See, e.g., Podesta v. Calumet Industries, Inc. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,433 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Donovan, 538 F. Supp. at 463.
228 744 F.2d 255 (2d. Cir. 1984).
229 See id. at 259.
230 [d.
231 The court noted that:
the business judgment rule governs only where the directors are not shown to
have a self-interest in the transaction at issue .... Once self-dealing or bad
faith is demonstrated, the duty of loyalty supersedes the duty of care, and the
burden shifts to the directors to 'prove that the transaction was fair and
reasonable to the corporation.'
[d. at 265.
232 [d.
233 [d. at 266.
234 See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
23S [d. at 266 n.l0.
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be significantly reduced provided there are other legitimate pur-
poses for implementing or maintaining an employee benefit plan
that owns employer stock."236 While there is often little doubt
that the true purpose of the ESOP is to lower the probability of
a future shift of control, it is clear that ESOPs established before
the announcement of a hostile tender offer are much less subject
to attack. This is so because: (1) it is "difficult for the offeror
to prove that such actions taken before a tender offer were
taken to fend off an unfriendly offer instead of for legitimate
corporate purposes;"237 (2) it is easier for ESOP trustees to show
compliance with their fiduciary duties if actions are taken before
the tender offer; and (3) courts are more likely to accept the
explanation that other legitimate purposes exist for the ESOP if
it is established in advance of the tender offer.238 Thus, while
courts will occasionally step in to prevent incumbent manage-
ment from using an ESOP solely as a means to retain corporate
control, ESOPs generally can be a significant impediment to
takeovers.
B. ESOPs as a Sword
At first blush it may seem as though ESOPs do not distort
the market for corporate control because the plans may be used
by both the acquiror and the acquired firm. Just as the target
may establish an ESOP in order to borrow money at subsidized
rates, buy its own stock and thereby acquire its own shares, so
also a raider may set up an ESOP to acquire shares in the target.
The acquiror causes the ESOP to borrow money from a bank
(also at subsidized rates), and uses this money to purchase its
own shares. The proceeds from the sale of stock to the ESOP
may be used by the acquiror to purchase shares of the target
firm. The acquiror generally will be required to guarantee the
ESOP's bank loan and make periodic contributions to the ESOP
to enable it to repay the loan, but it also will receive a tax
deduction for these contributions.239
While it may seem that ESOPs provide advantages to both
target firms and raiders, there are a number of factors that make
ESOPs more useful to target firms than to acquiring firms in the
236 Brecher, Lazarus & Gray, supra note 195, at 504.
237 [d. at 513.
238 See supra text accompanying note 236.
239 See supra note 51.
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battle for corporate control. First, because management of the
target firm typically controls the ESOP, it controls the "float"
or number of shares that the target firm has outstanding. The
outsider must locate shares in the open market and purchase
them above the current market price. As the Norlin case illus-
trates, incumbent management does not have to rely on market
purchases, but can cause the ESOP to purchase previously
unissued shares.240 Thus, while the acquiror may find it difficult
to acquire shares at the market price because the supply of such
shares is inelastic, the target has no such problem because it
can simply (and literally) print the additional shares it wants to
purchase.241
Second, even where the target firm and the raider are both
bidding for shares owned by current shareholders, the rollover
provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984242 give selling
shareholders a strong economic incentive to sell to the target
firm rather than to the acquiror. 243 Selling to the target firm's
ESOP enables the selling shareholder to avoid paying capital
gains taxes on the sale.244 Thus, while ESOPs are becoming a
potent weapon in the arsenal of incumbent management seeking
to retain control of their firm, these plans have not proved as
useful to management teams attempting to obtain control.
IV. COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM AND ESOPs
The call for tax simplification and reform is in the air. Ac-
cordingly, one might expect the inefficient and technically com-
pIe]} ESOP provisions to be eliminated. Indeed, President Rea-
gan's "Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and
Simplicity" ("Proposal") notes some of the problems with the
current ESOP provisions: "Despite the intentions behind [the
ESOP] provisions, they represent a confused mix of incentives
and requirements which fails to encourage direct employee own-
ership .... Indeed, if participation in the ESOP is in lieu of
current compensation, such deferral [of benefits] may actually
240 The board of directors of the target company in Norlin transferred 185,000 shares
of the firm's common stock to its newly created ESOP. See Norlin, 744 F.2d at 259.
241 See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 255 (9th Cir. 1975); Texas
International Airlines v. Continental Air Lines, No. 81-5514 (9th Cir., June 18, 1981).
242 See supra note 54.
243 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
244 See supra text accompanying note 54.
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lessen employees' overall incentive to increase productivity."245
The Proposal goes on to point out that the vesting requirements
and contribution and distribution limits associated with retire-
ment plans, when applied to ESOPs, "unnecessarily restrict the
ability of an employer to provide the benefits of owning em-
ployer securities to it:;; employees."246
Notwithstanding these enunciated reasons for change, the
Proposal would preserve the ESOP concept, albeit in a revised
set of provisions. Curiously, the proposal never justifies the
preservation of the ESOP concept.
The thrust of the changes incorporated in the Proposal is to
provide employees with greater control over stock received
pursuant to the ESOP provisions.247 "Direct ownership of em-
ployer securities, with the attendant rights and benefits, is far
more likely to be an incentive for employee productivity than a
speculative benefit to be ~ealized only upon separation from
service."248 Consequently, the Proposal requires the employee
stock ownership trust to distribute annually to participants a
portion of the securities held by the trust as well as all dividends
paid during the year.249 Employees would not have taxable in-
come upon distribution of securities from the trust.250
245 President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, GrolVth and Simplicity,
72 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 315 (extra ed. May 29, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Proposal].
246 [d. at 316.
247 [d. at 316-17.
248 [d. at 318. In addition to the changes discussed infra at text accompanyinq notes
249-63, the Proposal would repeal the special deduction limits available to a leveraged
ESOP and replace them with provisions allowing a deduction up to 25% of aggregate
employee compensation for principal payments on a loan taken out by the employer to
purchase stock contributed to an employee stock ownership trust. To qualify for the
25% limit, the yearly principal payments must be between 8.3% and 20% of the original
principal balance, or equal and amounting to a complete payoff in 10 years or less. See
Proposal, supra note 245, at 316. The special exception for ESOPs to the prohibited
transaction rules would be repealed as would the provision allowing an ESOP to assume
a decedent's estate tax liability. See Proposal, supra note 245, at 317-18.
Stock must be distributed to employees in accordance with their respective compen-
sation amounts, with amounts over $50,000 disregarded. The employee would be entitled
to a put-option beginning three years after stock is distributed and continuing for a
specified period of time each year thereafter. Dividends paid by the employer would
still be deductible, but a corresponding nondeductible payment to the employee receiv-
ing the dividend would be required in an amount offsetting the tax saving. [d.
249 Proposal, supra note 245, at 316-17. The portion is equal to schedujed principal
repayments for the leveraged ESOP stock for the year. The Proposal does not indicate
what must be distributed in the case of a non-leveraged ESOP.
The Proposal does allow a trust agreement to imbue the trust with nominal ownership
of the securities so long as the employees had all rights of direct ownership, including
the right to receive dividends, the right to vote, and the right to transfer the securities.[d. .
150 Proposal, supra note 245, at 317.
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The distribution of securities has several implications. First,
future dividends made on the distributed securities go directly
to the employee-shareholder. Second, the employee-shareholder
could vote on all corporate matters.2S1 Third, and probably most
important, employee-shareholders could choose to diversify
their investments by selling their shares in the open market. 252
In addition, an employee-shareholder may be able to take
advantage of the deferral provisions enacted as part of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.253 Accordingly, the ESOP bene-
ficiary could sell the employer securities to the employee stock
ownership trust and reinvest the proceeds in a timely fashion in
securities of another corporation, thereby postponing any rec-
ognition of gain.254
In its analysis of the suggested revisions, the Proposal notes:
[E]mployees should receive the benefits of owning the stock
currently, including the right to decide whether the employer
securities are an appropriate investment, rather than being
required, as under current law, to maintain an investment in
the employer through the ESOP. If ownership of employer
securities is a sound investment, the employees will readily
agree to continue that tax deferred investment and work to
enhance its value. On the other hand, if the employer stock
is a bad investment, employees should enjoy the same free-
dom to dispose of it as any other rational investor. Employ-
ees are poorly served where the tax law overrides their own
judgments.255
Providing employee-shareholders with the freedom to diver-
sify their portfolios is wholly consistent with the criticisms lev-
elled in this Article at existing ESOP provisions.256 However,
251 Under the existing provisions, it is not required that beneficiaries of the employee
stock ownership trust vote on all corporate matters. See supra text accompanying note
43.
252 The present requirement that ESOPs invest "primarily" in employer securities
severely restricts the diversification potential of the plans. See supra text accompanying
notes 135-57.
Under the Proposal, an employer would be required periodically to grant employees
the right to "put" the securities to the employer at their fair market value, starting three
years after receipt. See Proposal, supra note 245, at 317. The seller essentially would
have ordinary income on that portion of the sales proceeds equal to the fair market
value at the time of distribution and capital gains on any excess. [d.
253 See supra text accompanying note 55. It is not clear if the Proposal would permit
an employee to use the rollover provision. I.R.C. § 1042(c)(I)(C) (West Supp. 1985)
contains a caveat that securities acquired under a "qualified plan" are not eligible for
rollover treatment. Bu! see Proposal, supra note 245, at 319.
254 The basis in the newly purchased securities would preserve the unrecognized gain.
See supra note 55.
25S Proposal, supra note 245, at 319.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 135-56.
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the Proposal grants freedom in a convoluted and costly man-
ner-one that maintains existing distortions. Even with the Pro-
posal's liberalized grants of sovereignty to employee-sharehold-
ers, the ESOP provisions would retain many of their distortive
features in the nature of tax advantages: loans to employee stock
ownership trusts would remain subsidized through an interest
exclusion for the lender;257 gain on stock sold to an employee
stock ownership trust could still be deferred while deferral is
unavailable for stock sales in general;258 dividends on ESOP
stock would still be deductible by the employer while dividends
on non-ESOP stock are not deductible;259 and ESOP benefits
would still favor labor rather than capital investment.260
In fact, a far more effective mechanism for promoting worker
capitalism would be available with some modest revisions in the
existing laws governing individual retirement accounts. Sup-
pose, for example, that an employee received $100 in cash from
X Corporation (X Corp.). This amount would be fully taxable.
The employee could purchase stock of X Corp. pursuant to the
individual retirement account (IRA) provisions.261 The tax con-
sequences of such a purchase would be a $100 deduction off-
setting the $100 of income. The same tax consequences result
if the employee purchased securities of Y Corporation instead
of X Corp. In such a case, the same opportunities for increased
worker capitalism are available through the simple operation of
IRAs as through the labyrinthian ESOP provisions. Full enjoy-
ment of those advantages would require some modifications of
257 See Proposal, supra note 245, at 317. See also supra text accompanying notes 58-
74 (explanation of the interest exclusion).
258 See Proposal, supra note 245, at 317; see also supra note 253. Retention of the
rollover feature introduced by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 perpetuates the imbal-
ance between target and acquiror companies discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 221-24.
259 The Proposal attempts to ensure that the benefits of that deduction are passed on
in their entirety to the employee-shareholders by conditioning the deduction on an
additional nondeductible cash payment to ESOP recipients equal to the tax saving from
the deduction. Proposal, supra note 245, at 317-18. Regardless of the Proposal's at-
tempt, the way that the dividend deduction is divided between employer and recipient
is a function of the demand and supply curve for labor. For example, if the supply curve
for labor is very inelastic, granting a tax benefit for dividends paid"to employee-share-
holders will largely benefit the employers. The converse is true if the supply curve is
elastic. Where Congress legislates who is to receive the benefit of the deduction, the
employer and shareholder-employees will find other ways to reach market equilibrium.
If the market has an elastic labor supply curve, other compensation will be lowered to
offset the legislated payment. See also supra note 72.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 95-112.
26\ See I.R.C. § 219 (1982). I am treating I.R.C. § 219 at this point as if it did not
contain its restrictive provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 264-68.
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existing IRAs. The deduction currently available to taxpayers
contributing to an IRA is limited to $2000, with an additional
$250 for a spousal IRA.262 The Proposal would increase the
spousal IRA to $2000, thus permitting an overall $4000 deduc-
tion per joint return.263 If the IRA concept replaced the ESOP
provisions as well as other special tax incentives aimed at in-
creased investment, other restrictions would have to be elimi-
nated.264 For example, the deduction limits, even as increased
under the Proposal, should be eliminated.265 In addition, the
restrictions on premature withdrawaP66 should be eliminated so
that taxpayers can move in and out of investments as the market
dictates.
Eliminating the ESOP provisions in favor of expanded IRA
provisions would be efficient in at least two respects. First, the
costs of implementation and enforcement of the complex ESOP
provisions would be eliminated.267 Second, the distortions dis-
cussed in this Article associated with the ESOP provisions
would be eliminated.268
V. CONCLUSION
Tax subsidized ESOPs cause significant market distortions for
little benefit, but they are not alone in this regard. Our criticisms
of the ESOP provisions are equally applicable to a host of other
isolated provisions269 that provide tax benefits in order to en-
courage investment under an income tax system that promotes
consumption over investment.270 Our preferred response to
these criticisms is movement to a consumption tax which would
in principle allow a deduction for savings and investment.271
Broadening the IRA provisions is consistent with that response
and would obviate the need for the existing welter of deferred
262 See I.R.C. § 219 (1982).
263 See Proposal, supra note 245, at 340-41.
264 For a description of the restrictions and requirements associated with IRAs, see
Lipsig, Individual Retirement Arrangements [1984] TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 355.
us See Proposal, supra note 245, at 317-18.
266 See I.R.C. § 408(f) (1982).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 23-49 for a discussion of ESOP requirements.
268 See supra text accompanying notes 84-193.
269 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 38 (1982) (investment tax credit); I.R.C. § 613 (1982) (percentage
depletion); I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) (capital gains deduction); I.R.C. § 168 (1982) (acceler-
ated depreciation).
IIO See supra text accompanying notes 4-5 and 84-91.
III See R. HALL & A. RABUSHKA, supra note 4; Doemberg, supra note 4.
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compensation arrangements, each with their special tax advan-
tages and concomitant economic distortions.272 Moreover, the
heart of the ESOP provisions-the deduction to the employer
and deferral by the employee-shareholders-can be realized
through the already existing IRA concept without the distorting
tax advantages presently associated with the ESOP provisions.
Would expanding the IRA provisions (or adopting a full
fledged consumption tax) lead to greater worker capitalism. and
productivity, a goal of ESOP proponents? This is, of course, a
complicated question. But there is a direct, revealing response.
Workers given cash compensation will vote with their dollars.
Some dollars will go to current consumption, some to invest-
ments in the employer's stock and some to outside investments.
Just as employees would be free to vote with their dollars,
employers convinced that worker productivity does increase
with employee ownership could insist on compensating workers
in part with the employer's stock. The market would then de-
termine whether employees would choose such a compensation
package or would opt for alternative packages (perhaps all cash)
offered by the employer's competitors.
In any case, it is clear that at any given level of compensation
firms will choose that compensation package which attracts the
most productive employees. Thus, removing ESOP restrictions
will lead to greater worker productivity, if not greater worker
capitalism. Ifworker capitalism is inconsistent with worker pro-
ductivity, no amount of regulation will cause that inconsistency
miraculously to disappear.
The distortion of the taxpayer's consumption/investment de-
cision which is caused by the income tax273 could be eliminated
by moving to a consumption tax (which would allow a deduction
for investment). This, in turn, would eliminate the need for
special legislation designed to increase worker productivity and
worker capitalism. Unless ESOP proponents can point to some
sort of market failure to support the tax policies currently in
place, we suggest that employers and employees determine in
the free market the appropriate level of employee stock own-
ership rather than the Congress through tax incentives.
272 See Proposal, supra note 245, at 339-82.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
HeinOnline -- 23 Harv. J. on Legis. 158 1986
